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The Good Occupation 
 





 Abstract:  Many Americans picture the Allied (i.e., U.S.) Occupation of Japan 
(1945-52) as the quintessentially good occupation:  elaborately planned in advance, 
idealistically administered until derailed by anti-Communist indeologues in its later years, 
it laid the foundation for Japan’s post-War democracy and prosperity.  In fact, the 
Americans -- especially those Americans celebrated as most "idealist" -- did not plan a 
Japanese recovery, and for the first several years did not work for one.  Instead, they 
mostly just planned retribution:  whom to hang, and which firms to shutter.  Economic 
issues they entrusted to Japanese bureaucrats, and those bureaucrats merely manipulated 
the controls they had used to disastrous effect during the War.  Coming from a New Deal 
background in Washington, the Americans enthusiastically urged them on. 
  Although the Japanese economy did grow, it did not grow because of the 
Occupation.  It grew in spite of it.  In early 1949, Japanese voters overwhelmingly 
rejected the political parties offering economic controls.  In their stead, they elected 
center-right politicians offering a non-interventionist platform.  These politicians then 
dismantled the controls, and (despite strong opposition from New Deal bureaucrats in the 
Occupation) imposed a largely non-interventionist framework.  As a result of that choice 
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  They left Japan in shambles.  By the time they surrendered in 1945, Japan's 
military leaders had slashed industrial production to 1930 levels (Ando, 1987: 2-3).  Not 
so the American occupiers.  By the time they left in 1952, they had rebuilt the economy 
by 50 percent (id.: 3).  By 1960 the economy had tripled again, and by 1970 tripled once 
more (id.).  
  For Japan’s spectacular economic recovery, the American-run Allied Occupation 
had apparently set the stage.  The Americans had occupied, and the economy had boomed.  
The Americans had ruled, and Japan had thrived.  The occasional intellectual might 
bemoan the “bourgeois structures” the Americans had bequeathed, or Japan's complicity 
in American "imperialist ambitions."  But at least by an economic metric and at least 
during the Occupation’s early years, the Americans had apparently planned and run a 
beneficent Occupation.  Idealists all (or mostly all, during those early years) they had 
planned and run the quintessentially “good Occupation.” 
  In fact, the Americans had done nothing of the sort.  When they arrived in August 
1945, other than to crush the zaibatsu conglomerates and to impose draconian reparations 
they brought no economic plan.  Rather than invent one, they simply helped incumbent 
bureaucrats keep the rigid controls they had used -- disastrously -- through the War.  
Coming from the Washington New Deal, many of them brought an instinctive aversion to 
competitive market policies.  They first rehabilitated (and freed from prison) the Marxist 
leaders and intellectuals whom the militarists had feared.  They then let those intellectuals 
hijack the state apparatus to ideological ends.  Accustomed to universal manhood 
suffrage since 1925 (the first general election was in 1928), with a Socialist premier 
Japanese voters let them try.   
  By 1948, Japanese voters had had enough.  Under these economic controls, 
miners did not mine.  Firms did not produce.  And farmers sold, if they sold at all, only 
on the black market.  With inflation out of control and production stuck at desultory 
levels, conservatives bolted the Socialist coalition.  They installed the quintessentially 
capitalist Shigeru Yoshida as prime minister, and Yoshida promptly shut down the 
planning apparatus.
1
  Japanese voters resoundingly ratified the change.  Inflation stopped, and 
Washington politicians -- having fired many of their New Dealers at home as well -- 
forced their control-inclined agents in Tokyo to acquiesce.  The economy rebounded, and 
after June 1950 (after it had already started to recover) enjoyed a procurement bonus 
from the Korean War.   
  Early Occupation bureaucrats also tried to impose on Japan several forthrightly 
vindictive economic programs.  Given the growing opposition in Washington to such 
policies, they had to manipulate self-consciously the agency slack within their own 
organization to do so.  Under the pretext of zaibatsu dissolution, they tried to liquidate 
over 500 of the largest Japanese firms -- not firms owned by the “zaibatsu” families, not 
munitions firms, not even “exploitative” firms, just big firms.  Under the pretext of 
reparations, they tried to ship overseas or demolish (they seemed not overly to care) over 
                     
1 On the (false) notion that the Japanese government continued to plan the economy through the 1960s and 
70s, see Miwa & Ramseyer (2002, 2003, 2004a, 2005: ch. 6). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 3 
500 of the biggest factories.  Only after several years did Washington intervene to stop 
them.   
  Ultimately, the story of the Japanese Occupation is not a story about a “good 
Occupation.”  It is not a story about successful planning, and it is not a story about 
idealism -- at least not about its compassionate variants.  Instead, it is a story about the 
potentially enormous agency slack in military occupations, in this case between 
MacArthur and the bureaucrats who nominally worked for him.  It is a story about the 
potentially disastrous effect of that agency slack on the people subject to the occupations.  
And it is a story about the potential for mitigating that slack through local elections.   
  We first review the historiography of the Occupation (Part I).  We then examine 
several aspects of the Occupation:  public order under the Occupation (II.B.); U.S. 
planning for the Occupation (II.C.); the economic planning during the Occupation (II.D.); 
the inflation that occurred, the austerity program the U.S. imposed, and the Korean War 
that followed (II.E.); and the conflicting tides of “idealism” and Cold-War fears (III.). We 
close with some preliminary thoughts about "land reform" and the “Red Purge” (IV.).  
We recognize that this presents a formidably broad topic for an article this short.  We 
proceed nonetheless in order to present a general framework for re-thinking the 
Occupation as a whole. 
 
I.  Occupation Historiography
A.  The Debate:
 1.    Point. -- In the half century since its close, Douglas MacArthur’s Occupation 
of Japan (called SCAP, for Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) has begotten a 
thriving historiography.  Like the French and American revolutions before it, it has 
offered histories for scholars of every -- well, nearly every -- stripe.  To Edwin O. 
Reischauer (1957: 224), Harvard historian and Kennedy's ambassador to Japan, 
MacArthur was the right man in the right place:  "one of the great names in Japanese 
history, surpassed by few in Japan's long annals."  Indeed, writes Reischauer, "[f]ew men 
who have found themselves in history's spotlight have better fitted the roles which 
destiny has given them than General MacArthur [as the] benevolent but absolute master 
of fate of eighty million people."  Showing "all the virtues that the Japanese admire" 
(here Reischauer lists "strength of will," "dignity," "firmness," "austerity," "capacity for 
hard work"), he "became to the Japanese the symbol of perfection, the inspired leader, the 
knight in shining armor" (Reischauer, 1957: 224-25). 
  If MacArthur was the right leader, for Reischauer (1957: 228-29) he had the right 
staff besides.  "General MacArthur's staff of experts in Tokyo and on the Military 
Government teams throughout Japan turned in a performance which was uniformly good 
and sometimes brilliant," effuses Reischauer.  "Most showed sincere enthusiasm for the 
great experiment upon which they were embarked," and that "enthusiasm and 
fundamental optimism carried them" through as necessary.  "It is hard to imagine," he 
concludes, "a conquering army that could have undertaken the physical and spiritual 
rehabilitation of the erstwhile enemy with greater good will and deeper sincerity."  
 
 2.    Counter-point. -- Scholars since have been less kind.  During the earliest years 
of the Occupation, Marxists had run the Japanese government while sympathetic New 
Dealers had stacked the Occupation.  By 1950, the conservatives ran Japan and Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 4 
Washington had reined in its New-Deal bureaucrats.  Themselves overwhelmingly 
Marxist (we gloss over the many differences among them), Japanese intellectuals never 
forgave the Occupation this "reverse course."   
  Neither have most American intellectuals.  By the 1970s American scholars in the 
field had adopted a "New Left" approach, and coupled a positive assessment of the 
Occupation's early years with a far more negative one of its "reverse course."  For these 
scholars, Reischauer’s earlier hagiography offered an easy target.  "Conservative School" 
scholars like him so dominated the field, complained they, that those who criticized the 
Occupation found themselves "hauled before witch-hunting investigative committees, 
pushed out of their jobs, and denied outlets for publication."
2   
  Of these New Left historians, John W. Dower has long been most prominent.  
Easily he has also been the most celebrated.  For his work on the War and Occupation, he 
has won not just an endowed chair at MIT but the Pulitzer Prize, the National Book 
Award, the Bancroft Prize in American History, and the Fairbank Prize in Asian History.   
To Dower (1975b: 486), the Occupation begat a "bourgeois-democratic 'revolution'" that 
one could properly understand only through "the dialectic between domestic 
configurations and the structure of post-surrender Japan's global involvement."  Within 
that global order, "the great legacy” of the Occupation has been the Japanese 
“acquiescence to the American imperium" (1975b.: 487).  Within that global imperium, 
one can properly understand the Occupation only through the "problems of capitalism, 
imperialism, ideology and class" (id.: 490).  And those problems one can properly 
understand only by considering "the role of ... the petroleum cartels, key banks ..., 
investment firms ...; the Rockefeller interests, agricultural and textile lobbies; etc." (id.: 
491 n.3). 
 
B.  Advance Planning for the Occupation:
  Even to critics of the Occupation like Dower, the Americans had planned the 
Occupation in advance.  Fundamentally, the critics laud the early years of the Occupation.  
It is its later years they detest.   
"Planning for the Occupation of Japan actually began in the immediate aftermath 
of Pearl Harbor," writes Dower (2002; see 2003d).  "Due in good part to the impressive 
activities of a small State Department group led by High Borton and George Blakeslee," 
he explains (Dower, 1993: 165), "planning for postsurrender Japan at the lower levels of 
the bureaucracy was in fact well advanced when the war ended."  
  Nor is Dower alone.  The State Department "had begun planning for the 
Occupation as early as 1942," explains one standard history (McClain, 2002: 524), "even 
while American forces in the Pacific still were on the retreat."  The planning involved 
more than State.  In fact, it involved a shifting series of experts in and out of government 
(Schonberger, 1989: ch. 1).  In the words of historian Marlene J. Mayo (1984: 3), it 
"developed over several years and involved many individuals and committees throughout 
the wartime bureaucracy ...."   
 
C.  The Planned Economy during the Occupation:
                     
2 Schonberger (1989: 4).  Their principal example seems to have been T.S. Bisson, denied a post at U.C. 
Berkeley (Schonberger, 1989: ch. 3).  We discuss Bisson at Section II.B.3., infra. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 5 
 1.    The American planners. -- To the Occupation's early years, claim many 
historians (e.g., Dower, 2003a), Americans brought an "idealistic vision of 'economic 
democracy.'"  They brought “a vision of economic democratization in which the state is 
assigned an important role" (Dower, 2003b).  Consistent both "with the lessons of 
successful wartime planning, and with the history of developing economies more 
generally," they gave government "a major role in setting priorities and guiding 
reconstruction" (Dower, 2003a).  
  These “idealist” Occupation bureaucrats imposed a planned economy, and to most 
American (and virtually all Japanese) historians the economic planning worked.
3  The 
planners planned, and the economy grew.  Effuses Dower (2003c), the Occupation’s 
success owed itself precisely to the planner’s zeal:  "What made the Occupation of Japan 
a success was two years or so of genuine reformist idealism before U.S. policy became 
consumed by the Cold War ....  One might say that the last great exercise of New Deal 
idealism was carried out by Americans in defeated Japan."  
 
 2.    The Japanese planners. -- Rather than implement their plans directly, 
Occupation planners worked through the Japanese government.  More specifically, they 
implemented their plans through (and entrusted even the details of plan design to) the 
Japanese planners who had run the economy during the War.  Those planners, in turn, 
operated what they called a "priority production system" (PPS; keisha seisan seido) 
masterminded by Marxist economist Hiromi Arisawa.
4  Through that system, they routed 
crucial economic resources (like coal) to critical sectors (like steel).  By doing so, 
explains Harvard historian Andrew Gordon (2003: 240), they were able “to revive 
production and feed steel back to the coal industry, which in turn could rebuild the 
mining infrastructure and raise productivity."   
  Although Liberal Party leader Shigeru Yoshida (Prime Minister from May 1946 
through May 1947) fought economic planning, his Japan Socialist Party (JSP) successor 
did not.  Upon taking power, Socialist Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama promptly 
implemented PPS with full force.  He "greatly strengthened and institutionalized [the] 
tendency toward planning," explains political scientist Laura Hein (1990: 119).  In time, 
writes sociologist Bai Gao (1997: 154), the economic planning office would become "the 
most powerful economic bureaucracy in Japanese history."  
 
 3.    The academic assessment. -- Among American scholars Gordon offers one of 
the more nuanced assessments of PPS, but even he pronounces it a success.  The system 
was "more carefully focused" than earlier plans (1998: 6), writes he, and "funneled 
capital and materials to the coal and steel industries ...."  By 1948 it "enjoyed some 
success," and the "crisis of shriveling production and soaring inflation had been 
averted ...."   
                     
3 A notable dissent appears in Flath (2000: 82), who correctly notes its disastrous consequences. 
4 For a summary of Arisawa’s approach to planning, see Gao (1997: 143).  Note that on economic controls, 
the war-time fascists and the modern left urged largely similar policies.  In the Japanese context, both the militarists 
and the Socialists urged analogous stands, stands that radically differed from those of the fundamentally non-
interventionist conservative politicians like Yoshida.   
Most of the Marxist intellectuals associated with Arisawa were not affiliated with the Japan Communist Party 
(JCP), but were instead affiliated (if anything) with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 6 
  Other scholars have been less modest.  "There can be no question that priority 
production achieved results," declares political scientist Chalmers Johnson (1982: 185).  
According to Gao (1997: 169), "[i]mplementation of the priority production program was 
largely successful in promoting productivity in key industries."  Indeed, asserts the late 
Princeton historian Marius Jansen (2000: 692), the "[e]conomic planning was essential in 
the context of postsurrender Japan."  The shortage of foreign exchange and the need to 
allocate scarce resources prudently "combined to make it possible and indeed necessary 
to shape the direction of the economy ... ."   
 
D.  The Reverse Course:  
 1.    Dodge and inflation.  Then, everything changed.  Between 1947 and 1949, 
write most historians, the Occupation dramatically shifted course.  In the by-elections of 
1946, Republicans captured both the House and the Senate.  Stridently, they pressured 
Truman to restrain his New Deal economic planners in Tokyo.  He did, and despite the 
Democratic resurgence in 1948 sent Detroit banker Joseph Dodge to Tokyo in February 
1949 to put the Japanese economy in order.  
  To most scholars, the Japanese economy presented little disorder for Dodge to fix.  
PPS had worked, after all, and at worst had created some inflation.  Nonetheless, Dodge 
mandated draconian austerity.  In the process, write most scholars, he did stop inflation.
5  
Unfortunately, for the inflation he imposed a “cure” far worse than the “disease”:  in the 
course of ending inflation, he jeopardized the very economy itself.  
  Again, Dower is typical.  Dodge "succeeded in reining in inflation," writes he 
(1999: 541), "but at costs that Japanese across the political spectrum found increasingly 
unpalatable. ...  Bankruptcies increased among smaller enterprises, and the media began 
devoting attention to suicides among small businessmen."   
  "The 'Dodge line' program indeed halted inflation, but industry found itself 
starved for capital," explains Gordon (2003: 241; see also Borden, 1984: 61-622). By 
early 1950, "Japan appeared on the brink not of recovery but of a deepening depression."  
For Dower (1972: 113-14), the suffering that Dodge imposed on Japanese workers 
epitomized “the U.S. support for the emergence of a dependable, capitalist ruling class in 
Japan.”  "[B]eginning in 1948 Shigeru Yoshida, with increasing U.S. support, began to 
fashion the 'tripod' of big business, bureaucracy, and conservative party which has 
controlled Japan to the present day."  Together, his policies constituted the "active ... 
encouragement of concentration, economic dualism, and gross disparities of wealth" 
(Dower, 1975b: 487, 486; ital. in orig.).  Together, they produced in Japan nothing less 
than a "bourgeois-democratic 'revolution.'"
6  
 
 2.    Depression and the Korean War. -- Through Dodge Washington bet the 
Japanese economy and lost, conclude most historians -- or would have lost but for the 
Korean War.  Once the war began in mid-1950, Washington started to order massive 
amounts of supplies from Japanese firms.  But for the war, claims Dower (1999: 541), 
“Dodge's policies [might well] have culminated in a bona fide depression."  
                     
5 Again, Flath (2000: 84; see also Sims, 2001: 262) is one of the few to note -- correctly -- that the inflation 
had stopped before Dodge arrived. 
6 Even scholars more sympathetic to the later Occupation than Dower credit Dodge with stopping inflation.  
See Reischauer (1957: 321-22); Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig (1967: 822); Allison (1997: 77); Tipton (2002: 157). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 7 
  Again, other scholars concur.  The war came "just as it appeared SCAP's 
medication might kill the patient,” writes Gordon (2003: 241).  It was “a blood 
transfusion that enabled the Japanese to survive,” Gao explains (1997: 194).  Declares 
Schonberger (1989: 225):  "Only the unexpected outbreak of the Korean War rescued the 
American position in Japan from the political and economic morass left in the wake of 
the Dodge Plan."   
 
II.  The Good Occupation
A.  Introduction:
  This account has almost no basis in fact.  Largely, MacArthur began the 
Occupation without plans.  His staff entrusted the economy to sitting Japanese 
bureaucrats, and those bureaucrats enforced a planned economy.  In doing so, they failed 
miserably.  Only because Japanese voters forced their government to dismantle those 
controls did the economy survive.  That Japanese government -- not Dodge -- stopped 
inflation, and that government -- not the Korean War -- created the structure behind the 
economic recovery.  Rather than Japanese welfare, the celebrated “idealists” of the early 
Occupation cared primarily about retribution.   
  Implicitly, many readers assume that the Occupation was a relatively peaceful 
affair.  We begin, therefore, by examining public order during the Occupation (Section 
B.).  We then turn to the economic planning and idealism (Sections II. C.-E., III.).   
 
B.  Was the Occupation Peaceful? 
 1.    Introduction. -- We picture the Occupation of Japan a quiet affair.  For all his 
criticism of later SCAP policy, even Dower (2003e; see also 2002, 2003d) claims "there 
was not a single incident of terrorism against the U.S. forces there after World War II."  
In fact, continues he (2003a), there "were no anti-American protests following Japan's 
defeat.  Not a single incident of terrorism or violence against the occupying forces took 
place."   
  No anti-American protests right after the defeat, perhaps, and very few (not none) 
violent incidents against the Occupation itself.  But over the course of the Occupation’s 
seven years there were anti-American protests a plenty.  There was also plenty of 
terrorism and violence against Japanese businesses and the government through which 
SCAP implemented its policies.
7   
 
 2.    Released prisoners and E.H. Norman. -- Overwhelmingly, this violence came 
from the left.  Generally, it came either from the Communists or from the other groups 
that vied with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) for power.  Because MacArthur's staff 
had rushed to free about 2,500 "political prisoners," many of the leaders of these groups 
had just come from prison.  Given the violence of the fringe left, they had not all been 
serving time for "thought crimes."  Some had been serving time for that violence itself.
8  
                     
7 Reischauer (1957: 217) characterizes the early post-war years as a time of "rampant lawlessness."  As his 
apotheosis of MacArthur illustrates, however, his discussion of the Occupation is hard to take seriously.  Among other 
things, he reports that because of a shortage of soap, "Japanese went dirty for the first time in history" (id.: 215).  
Similarly, he claims that if Japan "had been occupied by the Soviet Union, Japanese capabilities for national planning 
and collective endeavor could undoubtedly have made her a model Communist state" (Craig, et al., 1965: 812). 
8 Two of the released Communist leaders, for example, had been serving long sentences for torturing to death 
a police informant.  See generally Beckmann & Okubo (1969: 244-45). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 8 
Once they returned from prison, the politically motivated violence reappeared with a 
vengeance. 
A crucial player behind their release was one E. Herbert Norman.  Upon taking 
office at SCAP, Norman quickly went to visit imprisoned JCP leaders Kyuichi Tokuda 
and Yoshio Shiga.  As would become clear over the next several years, the early 
Occupation included many with close ties to the fringe left.  Among them, few would 
become more prominent than Norman. 
  A Japanese-born Canadian diplomat and historian, through his suicide in 1957 
Norman became among scholars of Japanese history a cause celebre.  Seconded from the 
Canadian foreign service, he had arrived at SCAP in 1945 as Chief of the Research & 
Analysis Section of the Chief Counterintelligence Office (Taylor, 1977: 126).  In that 
capacity, he soon raised the suspicions of the famously conservative chief of intelligence, 
Gen. Charles Willoughby.  Although he returned to the Canadian foreign service in 1946, 
suspicions that he maintained Soviet ties lingered.  Under American pressure, the 
Canadian government investigated him in the early 1950s.  When the U.S. Senate 
threatened to reopen the inquiry a few years later, he threw himself from a Cairo rooftop. 
  In death, Norman acquired iconic stature.  Norman had initially published his 
Ph.D. dissertation through a Communist front, but during the mid-1970s Dower arranged 
its re-publication from a commercial press.
9  A decade later, historian Roger Bowen 
published both a biography of Norman (Bowen, 1986) and a conference volume on his 
career (Bowen, 1984).  The National Film Board of Canada produced a fawning 
documentary (National, 1998).  Several scholars added adulatory essays to his Ph.D. 
dissertation and arranged its re-re-publication from the University of British Columbia 
Press (Norman, 2000).  And the Canadian government commissioned an inquiry into 
Norman that in 1991 (Lyon, 1991) declared triumphantly:  “Not one iota of evidence 
suggests that" he was a spy. 
  That the government would commission a study of a long-dead diplomat and 
historian of early-modern Japan reflects the emotions Norman continues to raise.  So, 
though, does the fact that the commission made the declaration it did.  No doubt the 
emotions reflect a continuing hostility toward Joseph McCarthy.
10  Probably they reflect 
loyalty toward a fellow fringe-left scholar.  Perhaps they even reflect Canadian 
embarrassment at having hired and then -- through the future Prime Minister -- protected 
a Communist in prominent and sensitive positions.
11   
                     
9 Dower (1975a).  Norman's dissertation had initially been published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
discussed in note 45, infra. 
10 This is also the hostility, of course, behind the implicit taboo on exactly the type of observations we are 
making here.  See Romerstein & Breindel (2000: xiii). 
11 A measure of the emotions raised by the Norman controversy appears in the government report itself, 
which devotes 10 of its 40 pages to an ad hominum attack on James Barros, the political scientist who wrote the book-
length study of Norman.  Primarily, the attack seems designed to paint Barros as a right-wing quack (Lyon, 1991:  249-
59).  Facing accusations that Norman worked for the Soviet Union, most writers respond :  (a) that the evidence against 
him is either circumstantial or hearsay (true enough), (b) that he was a brilliant scholar (possibly true, but also 
irrelevant), and (c) that he was compassionate and caring (but why should not some Soviet agents have been 
compassionate?).  The fact remains that there is serious evidence that Norman may have spied for the Soviets.   
Although the evidence is not conclusive, neither is any evidence that he did not spy. 
Norman's patron in the Canadian government was Lester Pearson (later Prime Minister).  On the various 
issues raised by Pearson's activities, see Barros (1986: chs. 7, 9-10); Costello (1988: 575) (Norman committed suicide Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 9 
  Because a Communist Norman was.  Even Dower concludes that "he was 
probably at least briefly a Communist Party member" in the 1930s (Dower, 2000: 252; 
see Lyon, 1991: 229; Taylor, 1977: 117).  Over the last several decades, members of the 
1930s Cambridge underground have described how he first joined their Communist cell, 
and then left to work undercover recruiting Indian students to the communist movement 
(e.g., Kiernan, 1987: 3).  For the next two decades, he then lied about that membership -- 
as again even Dower (2000: 252) admits.    
  Not one iota of evidence?  By the late 1990s, two Soviet agents had independently 
identified Norman as a fellow spy.
12  He had initially aroused Willoughby’s suspicions 
when he (whose assignment had nothing to do with Hungary) moved quickly to acquire 
all documents left by the Hungarian legation in Tokyo as it evacuated its embassy (Barros, 
1986: 38).  And after a book-length inquiry into the subject, political scientist James 
Barros (1986: 142) concludes that Norman probably worked first for the GRU (Soviet 
military intelligence), and later for the KGB.  "It can," he adds, "be said with reasonable 
certainty that, regardless of who ran Norman, he was enmeshed in Russian intelligence 
work." 
  Although most historians adamantly disagree with Barros, for our purposes 
whether Norman worked for the Soviets matters less than what he believed.  Regardless 
of whether Moscow ordered him to push policies that promoted Soviet interests in the 
Pacific and Communist interests in Japan, Norman would have pushed them on his own.  
This was, after all, 1945.  The U.S.S.R. was still an ally.  It had fought the Nazis at 
enormous cost.  It had kept secret the worst of Stalin’s atrocities.  And within that world, 
Norman shared with many intellectuals an enthusiasm for the Soviet collectivist 
experiment.  With them, he shared as well a passion for helping make that experiment 
work.   
  Norman’s policy preferenes matter because he potentially played a crucial (albeit 
hidden) role in the Occupation.  He did not just engineer the release of Communist 
leaders from prison.  With the help of John Stewart Service he facilitated the return of 
Sanzo Nosaka (Stalin's choice to head the JCP; T. Cohen, 114) from the Communist 
stronghold in Yanan (Barros, 19: 39-40).  Service, in turn, had himself been indicted on 
espionage-related charges in the U.S., but the government had transferred him to Tokyo 
after deciding that it could not introduce the evidence against him in court.
13   
                                                             
to protect Pearson); and Pincher (1984:  417-18).  Elizabeth Bentley's Senate testimony implicating Pearson in Soviet 
espionage is reproduced in Barros (1986: App. A). 
12 Anthony Blunt:  "Herb was one of us," "he was relevant to the 'game,'" "definitely in the game".  Anatoly 
Golitsyn:  Norman was a "long-term communist and KGB agent."  See Barros (1986: 120, 138); Lyon (1991: 244); 
West (1982: ch. 5 & 76); Pincher (1981: 139); Costello (1988: 578).  Defectors do not always tell the truth, of course.  
Some -- like Elizabeth Bently -- have given accounts that later evidence has largely confirmed (see Section III.C.1., 
infra).  Others like Golitsyn are more problematic.  According to Cold-War historian John Haynes (private 
correspondence), "Golitsyn, while a genuine defector, over time kept remembering more and more about areas of 
Soviet espionage that based on his history in the agency he likely knew little about." 
13 Contrary to most accounts, Service most certainly had not been “cleared” or “acquitted” of those espionage 
charges.  He had initially been arrested in June 1945 on charges relating to the leaking of classified information to the 
journal Amerasia.  Connected to the journal were a variety of Soviet and Communist Chinese spies, as discussed in 
note 45, infra; see also Romerstein & Breindel (2000: 169); Haynes & Klehr (1999: 375).  The charges against him 
were dropped (a) partly because much of the prosecution’s evidence came from illegal wire taps and a warrantless 
search (West, 1999: 282-83), and (b) partly because Lauchlin Currie (himself a Soviet agent figuring prominently in 
recently released decoded Soviet cables) personally intervened in the case to obtain the cooperation of the future 
Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, who was then maneuvering to become Attorney General (Romerstein & Breindel, Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 10 
According both to his supporters (Dower, 2000: 256; Ferns, 1983: 212; Lyon, 
1991: 225; Taylor, 1977: 129) and to his critics (Barros, 1986: 42, 125), Norman had 
MacArthur's trust.  "Our most valuable man" (Lyon, 1991: 225), MacArthur once called 
him.  He met regularly with MacArthur in private, listened to him, advised him, and 
served as his general confidant.  Obviously, both his supporters and critics have an 
incentive to exaggerate his impact on policy.  The possibility that a Soviet spy might have 
served as MacArthur's confidant, however, obviously makes it harder to assess the 
Occupation. 
 
 3.    Strikes. -- Strikes plagued the Occupation from the start.  Just during 1946, 
their number climbed from 27 strikes involving 6,000 workers in January, to 104 
involving nearly 189,000 workers in October (Moore, 1997: 14).  With their leaders out 
of prison and back in action, the left was rapidly organizing the workforce.  By June 1946 
it had recruited 3.7 million members into 12,000 unions.  By June 1948 it had recruited 
6.7 million to 34,000 unions (Tamaki, 1976: 53; Okochi, 1966: 548).  The strikes 
continued to involve 200,000 (in 1946) to 2.3 million (in 1948) workers a year through 
1952 (Okochi, 1966: 552). 
  The fringe left did not just encourage unions and strikes; it also tried to destroy 
the conservative Yoshida government.  Toward that end, in early 1947 it masterminded a 
nation-wide general strike.  The time seemed ripe.  The previous fall, South Korean 
workers had conducted a massive general strike (albeit one that left 6,500 people dead).  
The French Communist Party had captured first place in the general election.  Toward 
their own strike, the Japanese leaders could claim the support of 6 million workers (T. 
Cohen, 1987: ch. 15).   
  For weeks, the Occupation gave only ambiguous signals, but on the eve of the 
strike itself MacArthur finally intervened:  the strike, he announced, could not proceed.  
One might have thought it an easy case.  After all, general strikes miss the point of 
democracy.  Voters cannot maintain a functioning electoral system if labor unions can 
veto their choices through a general strike.  For that obvious reason U.S. courts ban the 
tactic, and Japanese courts hold it illegal as well.
14   
  Even on so basic a principle, however, MacArthur faced a divided staff.  While 
labor specialist Theodore Cohen thought SCAP should stop the strike, others like 
economic analyst T.A. Bisson did not.  Bisson worked in the Government Section, and 
would later claim to have promoted the Occupation's "deconcentration" program (see Sec. 
III.B.,  infra;see Haley, 2001: 19-21, 40 & n.154).  According to historian Howard 
Schonberger (1985: 102), he also argued ”in favor of permitting the general strike.”  
  Bisson also passed documents to GRU spies.  Hauled before Senate hearings and 
fired from an untenured post in Berkeley in 1953, he has like Norman played the martyr 
in academic hagiography.  Indeed, as a “Progressive” scholar who stood by his principles 
at all costs, he earns an entire chapter in Schonberger’s (1985: ch. 3) Occupation history.  
But if Norman possibly worked for the Soviets, Bisson leaves no doubt.  Instead, decoded 
                                                             
2000: 168; Klehr & Radosh, 1996: chs. 5, 6).  In what many believe to have been an attempt to cover-up the infiltration 
of the State Department by Soviet spies, Service was not fired but instead sent to Tokyo (Klehr & Radosh, 1996: 135).  
His co-defendant Andrew Roth would turn up in Tokyo as well. 
14 See Koku v. Toyama, 460 Hanrei jiho 10 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 1966). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 11 
wartime Soviet cables released in the 1990s (known as the “Venona files”) forthrightly 
report his passing war-related documents to Soviet military intelligence.
15
  Despite his apparently fractured staff, MacArthur did intervene, and did ban the 
general strike.  The elections followed in April, and a majority of the voters chose one of 
the conservative (Progressive or Liberal) parties.  Although nearly 18 percent also voted 
Socialist, given the sub-4 percent showing for the JCP Bisson blamed MacArthur.  By 
intervening, wrote he (Bisson, 1949: 51), MacArthur had prevented "a sweeping 
democratic victory at the polls."   Scholars since have followed Bisson’s line.  By 
banning the general strike, declares Dower (1999: 270), he signaled "the beginning of the 
end of the possibility that labor might be an equal partner in the sharing of 'democratic' 
power." 
 
 4.    Plant takeovers. -- Militant workers also commandeered plants and ran them 
on their own.  Over the course of 1946, 140,000 workers in 170 unions used the tactic.  In 
January 1946 they took over 13 factories.  In May they took over 56, and the number of 
commandeered factories stayed above 20 a month for the rest of the year (Tamaki, 1975: 
55; Moore, 1997: 14).   
  For Dower (1999: 257), the takeovers represented "the emergence of a truly 
radical anticapitalist ethos at the grass-roots level."  For Gordon (1998: 8), they 
symbolized the "revolutionary" challenge to "fundamental notions of private property and 
managerial authority."  For some Japanese scholars, they constituted incipient workers' 
soviets (Yamamoto, 1977: 74).  And for Dower’s student Joe Moore (1978: 209, 266), 
they "promised a fundamental, democratic reconstruction of Japanese society" and the 
"democratization of the social relations of production."   
  Not surprisingly, factory owners thought otherwise.  Indeed, they thought the 
tactic theft.  After all, if workers had wanted the company, they could have pooled their 
money and bought it.  Had they been willing to pay, they could have obtained the stock 
like anyone else.   
  Nor was the Japanese government pleased.  If workers could expropriate assets 
that investors contributed, investors would not invest.  If investors did not invest, firms 
would have no products to sell, consumers would have no goods to buy, and laborers 
would have no place to work.  The government called the takeovers a crime, and the 
courts eventually agreed.
16   
                     
15 One report from a GRU agent in New York to Moscow in 1943 reads (Venona cable of June 16, 1943, 
available at www.nsc.gov; see also June 17, 1943 and June 24, 1943): 
MARQUIS[MARKIZ][i] [Joseph Bernstein] has established friendly relations with T.A. BISSON, 
(in future "ARTHUR[ARTUR]") who has recently left BEW [ii] [Board of Economic Warfare]; he is now 
working in the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the editorial offices of MARQUIS’ periodical 
[Amerasia]. . . ARTHUR passed to MARQUIS, so that as his colleague in the editorial office he might get 
acquainted with them, copies of four documents: (a) his own report for BEW with his views on working out a 
plan for shipment of American troops to China; (b) a report by the Chinese embassy in WASHINGTON to its 
government in China . . . . (c) a brief BEW report of April 1943 on a general evaluation of the forces of the 
sides on the Soviet-German front . . . . (d) a report by the American consul in Vladivostok . . . . 
See generally Benson (2001: 43); Haley (2001: 19-20); Romerstein & Breindel (2000: 169).   
16 E.g., Koku v. Kitao, 6 Saiko saibansho keiji hanrei shu 288 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 1952); Koku v. Otaka, 4 
Saiko saibansho keiji hanrei shu 2257 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 1950); Koku v. Tsuyuki, 55 Keiji saiban shiryo 51 (Kofu D. 
Ct. June 20, 1948). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 12 
  When government leaders contacted SCAP, however, the Occupation refused to 
help.  Labor bureaucrat Cohen (1987: 219) thought the takeovers "ingenious" and reports 
that his colleagues found them "bemusing."  Even in the West, he told his superior (1987: 
222), the “limits” to “ownership rights” were still "ill-defined."  To the Japanese 
government leaders, SCAP explained that helping to enforce the law against plant 
takeovers “would contravene Washington official policy” (T. Cohen, 1987: 223).  On this 
issue, the Japanese leaders had no choice but to struggle forward on their own. 
 
 5.    Sabotage and violence. -- Year-in year-out throughout the Occupation, 
sabotage plagued the public.  Sabotage was particularly common at the national railroad.  
There, it took a bloody turn.  In June 1949, the company president was found dead on the 
tracks, apparently murdered.  The police suspected union organizers, but never 
successfully proved the crime.   
  The next month, saboteurs slammed an unmanned train into a suburban Tokyo 
station, and killed six people.  The police fingered ten radical union members, and the 
courts convicted one.
17  In August, saboteurs derailed a train carrying 400 people.  This 
time, they killed three.  The police again suspected union members, and several 
confessed.
18
  Stalin, however, wanted more.  Through the Cominform journal in January 1950 
(then reprinted in Pravda), he ordered the JCP to take a more violently revolutionary tack 
(Sengo, 1985: 99, 305).  After some internal debate over whether to comply, party leaders 
began organizing terrorist attacks on police stations and public facilities.  Having shifted 
criminal violence from the militant fringe to the party’s central platform, they went 
underground and orchestrated bombings across the country (Sengo, 1985: 49; Keisatsu, 
1982: 376-79). 
  Mass demonstrations followed.  On May Day 1949, fringe-left groups drew a 
crowd of 3,000.  A demonstrator died in the ensuing melee, and to commemorate his 
death the groups organized another rally for May Day 1950.  This time, they drew 15,000 
demonstrators, and when several SCAP soldiers tried to arrest a demonstrator they found 
themselves beaten by a 300-strong mob (Sengo, 1985: 88; Keisatsu, 1982: 247-50).   
  In 1952, the May Day riots turned worse still.  Armed this time with bats and 
bamboo spears, the mob numbered 400,000 in Tokyo alone.  When 5,000 left the 
prescribed path, they met police.  In the riot that followed, they burned thirteen American 
military vehicles, and trashed another 29.  The police responded with tear gas.  When the 
air cleared, one person lay dead and 400 injured (Keisatsu, 1982: 362-67). 
 
C.  Was Occupation Economic Policy Planned?
 1.    Introduction. -- Wartime Americans did plan several things; they just did not 
plan what most right-thinking Americans would like to imagine they planned.  They 
planned whether to hang the emperor.  They planned whom else to hang.  They planned 
how many islands to leave Japan.  They planned which industries to shut down.  They 
                     
17 Koku v. Iida, 52 Hanrei jiho 1 (Sup. Ct. June 26, 1955). 
18 Nonetheless, prosecutors were unable to find enough collaborating evidence, and the courts eventually 
dismissed the charges.  Koku v. Suzuki, 346 Hanrei jiho 6 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 1963). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 13 
planned which firms to liquidate.  But on the economy, American planners planned little 
else.   
 
 2.    MacArthur’s mandate. -- At the outset, Truman’s staff in Washington claimed 
not to care whether MacArthur rebuilt the Japanese economy.  According to their 
November 1945 “Basic Post-Surrender Directive,” as his “ultimate objective” they 
wanted him (Basic, 1945: 429):  
to foster conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will 
not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and will permit 
her eventual admission as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of 
nations.  
His “ultimate objective,” in short, was not to rehabilitate; it was to prevent.  It was not 
positive; it was negative:  to ensure that Japan would not again threaten the rest of the 
world. 
  Still, readers might properly ask whether economic recovery would not help Japan 
rejoin the “family of nations”?  Might Truman’s staff have wanted MacArthur, in other 
words, to facilitate that recovery in order to reintegrate Japan?  If they did want that, they 
did not mention it in the details that followed.  Instead, they ordered him (a) to establish 
military control over the country; (b) to purge militarists from government and business; 
(c) to dissolve the military; (d) to punish war criminals; (e) to repatriate prisoners of war; 
(f) to censor militaristic expression; and (g) to preserve Japanese archives and to reopen 
schools in censored form.   
  Only in the Basic Directive’s third level of detail did Truman’s staff even discuss 
much about the economy.  There, they listed the economic goals they expected 
MacArthur to pursue, and “rebuild” was not one of them.  Instead, they ordered him 
(Basic, 1945: 433): 
  a.  To eliminate existing specialized facilities for the production of arms, 
munitions, or implements of war of any kind. 
  b.  To destroy the economic ability of Japan to create or support any 
armaments dangerous to international peace. 
  c.  To execute such program of reparations and restitution as may be 
decided upon by the appropriate Allied authorities. 
  d.  To encourage the development within Japan of economic ways and 
institutions of a type that will contribute to the growth of peaceful and democratic 
forces in Japan. 
  e.  To supervise and guide the operations of Japanese economic 
arrangements and operations to assure that they conform to the general purposes 
of the occupation, and make possible the eventual readmission of Japan to the 
ranks of peaceful trading nations.  
  Again, readers sympathetic to the early Occupation might ask whether the goals 
are not ambiguous.  Goal (b) is brutal by any measure, as any even moderately 
prosperous country will have the “economic ability” to “create or support” a munitions 
industry.  But goal (d)?  Might Truman’s staff have thought economic recovery would 
“contribute to the growth of peaceful and democratic forces”?   
  Here too the details eliminate the ambiguity.  In further instructions, Truman’s 
staff (Basic, 1945: 434) order MacArthur to implement “the reduction or elimination of Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 14 
certain branches of Japanese production, such as iron, steel, chemicals, non-ferrous 
metals, aluminum, magnesium, synthetic rubber, synthetic oil, machine tools, radio and 
electrical equipment, automotive vehicles, merchant ships, heavy machines, and 
important parts thereof.”  Further, they instruct him to “insure that all laboratories, 
research institutes, and similar technological organizations are closed immediately except 
those you deem necessary to the purposes of the occupation.”   
  Make no mistake.  Under orders from Washington, MacArthur was to cripple or 
shut down the steel, chemicals, machine tools, light metals, electrical equipment, and 
automobile industries.  He was to close all research laboratories.  Destruction was central 
to the tasks Washington assigned him.  Recovery was not even among them. 
 
 3.    Mandated indifference. -- MacArthur had no plans to rebuild the economy, but 
officially he did not care.  Truman’s staff had ordered him not to care.  He had his 
instructions (Basic, 1945: 433-34): 
  You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of 
Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy.  You will make it clear to the 
Japanese people that: 
  a.  You assume no obligations to maintain, or have maintained, any 
particular standard of living in Japan, and  
  b.  That the standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with 
which Japan rids itself of all militaristic ambitions . . . and cooperates with the 
occupying forces and the governments they represent. 
  Instead, economic recovery was the province of the Japanese government (Basic, 
1945: 435): 
The Japanese authorities are expected to develop and effectively carry out 
programs of working activity that will enable them out of their own resources and 
labor to ... avoid acute economic distress.  
The Americans brought no plan to rebuild the Japanese economy.  They did not think it 
their job. 
 
D.  Did the Economic Planning Work?
 1.    Introduction. -- To claim not to care whether people have enough to eat is one 
thing.  To govern them successfully while they starve is another, and few governments 
can rule while feigning total indifference.  By necessity, SCAP soon found itself facing a 
crisis.   
  The economy lay in shambles.  Over the course of the preceding decade, the 
military had forcibly converted factories from civilian production (for which their owners 
had designed them) to military use (for which they had not).  Come 1944 and 1945, U.S. 
bombers had hit the efficient and inefficient alike, and leveled half the housing stock in 
most major cities.  From its colonies,  3.2 million Japanese now returned home.  From its 
military outposts came another 3.3 million (Kawai, 1960: 21).  Yet industrial production 
stood at a quarter of the annual production in 1931-33, and with scant fertilizer available 
the 1945 rice harvest reached barely two-thirds of the annual yields in 1933-35 (Okura 
sho, 1948: 551, 557). 
  Facing the prospect of social chaos, SCAP and the Japanese government set out to 
jump start this economy.  Controls came naturally to both.  SCAP civilians included not Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 15 
just obvious central planners like Bisson and Norman but a much larger cohort of 
committed New Dealers.  Given that the fascists had promoted economic planning too, 
the Japanese bureaucrats had also used controls in the 1930s and early 40s.  And in their 
economics departments, Japanese universities almost exclusively housed Marxist 
scholars.   
 
 2.    The personnel. -- (a) SCAP New Dealers.  As an organization, SCAP itself 
took no position on economic planning.  Like most large bureaucracies, on most issues it 
instead had many positions.  Maneuvering as he was for the Republican Presidential 
nomination, MacArthur himself did not push planning.  Neither, however, did he 
understand economics well enough and monitor his staff closely enough to oppose it 
consistently.  Many of the mid-tier military men in the Occupation apparently shared his 
sympathies, but into his civilian bureaucracy they had hired scores of planning-oriented 
New Dealers.
19
  Even Washington did not take a consistent line.  Truman himself did not try to 
plan or control the U.S. economy.  Yet he gave the Japanese government that option.  In 
November 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Japanese government that they would 
allow it "to establish and administer any controls over economic activities that are 
appropriate or necessary.”
20  Even as late as 1948, they ordered MacArthur to tell the 
Japanese government to "[e]stablish an effective program to achieve wage stability," and 




 (b)  Japanese bureaucrats.  The bureaucrats in the Japanese government were men 
of controls.  Although SCAP hanged the military leaders, it largely left the mid-level 
bureaucrats alone.  Finding support among SCAP New-Dealers for their command-and-
control instincts, they forthrightly kept their controls in place.
22  Over the late 1930s and 
early 40s, they had pushed reluctant firms to produce for the War with ever-more-rigid 
centralized controls.  As Miwa (2004: 19-20) put it, they had imposed “extremely strict 
government economic controls, with government control of the overall economy 
reinforced step by step."  
  During the War, the bureaucrats had implemented many of their controls through 
industry-specific “control associations.”  Given their military role, in mid-1946 SCAP 
ordered them dissolved (T. Cohen, 1949: 431).  Many, however, promptly regrouped.  
                     
19 According to Lattimore (1949: 106; discussed in Section III.C.2.(c), infra), the New Dealers were in Tokyo 
because, back in Washington, "Truman, in his first pathetic attempt to appease the Republicans in the name of 'unity,' 
was junking New Dealers as fast as they could be nudged out of the way by the cold-shoulder treatment." 
20 JCS-1380/15, in Government Section (1950: 435). 
21 Okura sho (1982: 739; Telegram W81014, from Draper to MacArthur, Dec. 11, 1948). 
22 The wartime controls (Yushutsu nyu hin to ni kansuru rinji sochi ni kansuru horitsu [Law Regarding the 
Temporary Measures Regarding Import and Export Items], Law No. 92 of Sept. 1937; Kokka sodoin ho [National 
Mobilization Act], Law No. 55 of 1938 and Law No. 19 of Dec. 1941) remained in place until October 1946, when a 
new regulatory statute took effect (Rinji busshi jukyu chosei ho [Temporary Law to Adjust the Supply of and Demand 
for Goods and Capital], Law No. 32 of 1946).  That new statute remained a control statute, and the regulations under 
the wartime statutes continued in place under the new statutes until gradually replaced.  Lest their be any doubt, the 
government passed a variety of regulations in early 1946 controlling price as well (E.g., Bukka tosei rei [Price Control 
Order], Choku rei No. 118 of Mar. 1946). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 16 
The association in the coal industry did not even wait for SCAP to dissolve it.  Instead, 
anticipating the SCAP decree, it dissolved in May 1946 on its own.  The next day, it duly 
re-emerged as the Coal Mining Association (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2004b: 66).   
 
 (c)  Marxist intellectuals.  Central to many of the post-War economic plans were a 
group of prominent Marxist academics.  Numbering perhaps two or three dozen, they 
formed a shifting group of men loosely organized around Hiromi Arisawa.  Like Arisawa, 
several had suffered under the wartime police for their “subversive” ideas.  Through the 
next two decades, their names would appear and reappear on a variety of prominent 
national committees, reports, and plans.   
  In early 1946, these intellectuals issued a report on the approach they would take.  
In it, planning figured prominently (Gaimu sho, 1946: 82).  “Fair and free competition is 
not the only route to ... the democratization of the Japanese economy,” they explained.  
Instead, “is it not necessary that financial institutions and basic industries be publicly 
owned, that the economy be planned, and that there be considerable national controls?”  
 
 (d)  ESB and ESS.  Crucial to the implementation of these controls lay the 
informal alliance between SCAP’s Economic & Scientific Section (ESS) and the 
Japanese government's Economic Stabilization Board (ESB; Keizai antei honbu).  Within 
SCAP, ESS contained some of the more determined New Deal civilians.  Those New 
Dealers had originally pushed the Japanese government to form ESB, the Cabinet had 
complied in March 1946, SCAP had approved the new organization in May, and the ESB 
had begun operations in August (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2004b: 63-65). 
  Although the government initially created ESB under a one-year term, in May 
1947 it extended that term and strengthened it.
23  Again, it did so under pressure from 
ESS.  Formally, the pressure came as a letter from MacArthur to Yoshida (General, 1947; 
letter of 3/22/47).  Yoshida had long opposed economic controls, but the letter declared it 
"the responsibility of the Japanese Government to maintain a firm control over wages and 
prices and to initiate and maintain a strict rationing program for essential 
commodities ...."  Toward that end, it ordered the government “through the Economic 
Stabilization Board which was created for this purpose, [to] take early and vigorous steps 
to develop and implement the integrated series of economic and financial controls which 
the current situation demands.”   
  That a Republican Presidential hopeful would sign such a letter illustrates the 
agency slack at SCAP.  In fact, MacArthur had not written the letter at all; long-time 
Norman friend and Marxist economist Shigeto Tsuru had.
24  In time, Tsuru would make a 
name for himself as a scholar and eventually university president.  Back in the 1930s he 
had overlapped with Norman at Harvard, and had studied there until the outbreak of the 
War forced him to return to Japan.   
After the War, Tsuru allied himself with the New Dealers in SCAP.  Together, 
they plotted to expand ESB's power over the economy.  As Tsuru later recalled, one day 
ESS chief William F. Marquat called in sick.  Marquat opposed strong controls but his 
                     
23 Choku rei No. 193 of 1947. 
24 Norman's early run-in with FBI agents came in 1942 when he lied to them in an effort to obtain some of 
Tsuru's documents and books from his Cambridge, Mass., apartment (Tsuru had been sent back to Japan).  See Barros 
(1986: 27-31); Bowen (1984: 54); Dower (1975: 99); Ferns (1983: 218-20). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 17 
stand-in, statistics section chief Ross, did not.  With Marquat out, Ross and Tsuru 
discussed what to do.  Ross suggested that Tsuru simply draft whatever letter he wanted.  
Tsuru did, Ross took it to MacArthur for his signature, and MacArthur sent it to Yoshida 
(Hayashi, 1994: 20).   
  The New Dealers at SCAP wanted ESB because of the way it helped both them 
and their Japanese colleagues circumvent their more conservative superiors.  In ESB, 
ESS had a counterpart with which it could deal directly.  In effect, by working together 
the control-oriented bureaucrats at ESS and ESB could cut out the more market-oriented 
men for whom they nominally worked.  As a result, wrote economic historian Takafusa 
Nakamura (1986: 187), the economic plans of the early Occupation constituted "the joint 
creation of the young economists in SCAP and the bureaucrats at Japan's Economic 
Stabilization Board.  Those plans reflected a policy-omnipotence, a confidence that one 
could run an economy effectively through economic control."   
  To facilitate their collusion, SCAP New Dealers created in the renewed ESB a 
post expressly for Tsuru.  Over the Board as a whole they placed a coordinating 
committee, and for Tsuru they created the position of deputy chair.  "At this point, you 
know how things work at SCAP," Tsuru remembered their explaining.  "So you should 
go to the ESB.  That's why we created the Consolidated Coordinating Committee in the 
first place."  The committee itself never did much, Tsuru adds, but the vice chairmanship 
brought him a direct telephone line to SCAP and involved him in the negotiations over a 
wide variety of policies (Hayashi, 1994: 22). 
 
 3.    The economic planning. -- (a) Introduction. -- Economic controls do not work.  
They should not work in theory, and as Eastern Europe demonstrated in spades they do 
not work in practice.  In Japan in the late 1940s they did not work either.  In our 
companion study in Japanese we examine the effectiveness of PPS in greater detail 
(Miwa & Ramseyer, 2004b).  Here, we summarize those results and offer illustrative 
evidence. 
By most accounts, PPS ran from the last quarter of fiscal 1946 (Jan.-Mar., 1947) 
through late calendar 1948.
25  Not until Katayama formed a Socialist-coalition cabinet in 
the spring of 1947, though, did it flourish.  His JSP captured 26.2 percent of the popular 
vote that April, and 143 of the 466 seats (Table 1).  With the support of the Progressive 
and Cooperative Parties, he then assembled a cabinet.   
  [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
  By late 1948, PPS had lost momentum.  Katayama himself had stayed in power 
only through the winter of 1948.  Faced with chronic labor problems and defections 
within his party, he lost control in February, and power passed in March to Democratic 
Party (formerly the Progressive Party) head Hitoshi Ashida.  Plagued by a bribery scandal 
(Keisatsu, 1982: 202-09), Ashida did not last long as premier.  Yoshida pulled his Liberal 
Party from Ashida's coalition in July, and assembled his own coalition government that 
October.  Once in office, he began to dismantle Katayama’s controls.  He accelerated that 
                     
25 The statutory and regulatory provisions behind the program are complex, and we detail them in Miwa & 
Ramseyer (2004b).  On Dec. 27, 1946, the Cabinet passed a plan for the production for the next quarter, and decided to 
organize a special fund for allocating capital preferentially to crucial industries.  As this was not formally known as 
PPS, some ambiguity in the exact timing of the program is unavoidable.  See Tsusho (1976: 456). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 18 
de-control after winning the January 1949 election, and by September 1949 had 
eliminated PPS entirely.  
  
 (b)  The JSP agenda.  Long before its electoral victory, the JSP had planned to 
nationalize key industries.  It had made “the realization of a socialist planned economy” 
key to its fall 1945 platform.  Toward that end, it had declared it would work to 
“nationalize the steel industry, the coal industry, the artificial fertilizer industry, the 
electrical power industry, and other basic industries.”  Indeed, it continued, it would 
“nationalize the banking, trust, and insurance industries” as well (Nihon shakai to, 1966: 
7, 71, 84).   
  Then, in 1947 the Socialists actually took control.  In his memoirs, SCAP Labor 
Division Chief Theodore Cohen remembered them well.  When Katayama assembled his 
cabinet, he recalls, they were ecstatic (T. Cohen, 1987: 316).  "Only two years before, 
their leaders -- agitators, lawyers, journalists, scholars, trade union organizers -- whether 
in prison or out, had been in political oblivion.  Now they found themselves vaulted 
suddenly to the helm of state.”    
  The election, declared the Socialists, had given them a mandate to shift “the basis 
of our national structure from capitalism to socialism" (quoted in T. Cohen, 1987: 315).  
Socialism was but the “logical extension of democracy" (id.: 316).  Already in 1946 they 
had introduced legislation to nationalize the coal industry.  Now the time had come to 
proceed apace (Nihon shakai to, 1966: 7, 71, 84).  At the heart of their basic program lay 
economic controls, and at the heart of the controls lay PPS.  
  
 (c)  PPS design.  Introduction.  For both the planners themselves and the later 
historians, coal was key to PPS.  As the energy source for perhaps half the industrial 
production, coal was central to the Japanese recovery (Nihon sekitan, 1957: 29 
[excluding imported coal]; Tsusho sangyo sho, 1992: 73 tab. 3-2-1).  To recover, the 
Japanese economy badly needed coal. 
  When the War ended, coal production shut down as well.  In the early months of 
1945, Japanese mines still produced at mid-1930s levels.  By December they extracted 
only a quarter of the 1935-37 monthly average, and by June of 1946 still extracted less 
than half (Okura sho, 1948: 559).  To recover, Japan badly needed more coal.   
 
  Prices.  To increase that coal production, PPS could have let prices rise, of course.  
Had it merely left coal alone, demand would have raised prices.  Those higher market 
prices would then have induced mines to dig what users could cost-effectively use.  Let 
mines earn a market return on the coal they dig, and they will dig coal.  That tactic, 
however, the government refused to use.  Instead, it tried to increase production while 
keeping prices low.   
  In effect, the government wanted firms to mine coal for prices below what it cost 
to mine it.  On Figure 1, we plot authorized PPS prices against production costs.   
Consistently, prices fell short of costs.  To be sure, we take the production costs from the 
mining industry association, and it had every incentive to exaggerate them (Hokkaido, 
1958: 876, 915).  Even if accurate, moreover, the figures give average rather than 
marginal costs.  Notwithstanding, the Figure suggests a basic point:  under the authorized 
price regime, firms had little incentive to extract their coal. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 19 
  [Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
  Not only did PPS not use prices to increase production, it barely regulated 
production at all.  Instead, it primarily regulated distribution.  There, however, it imposed 
draconian controls.  It required mines to sell their output to a single government-
controlled firm.  It set the price that firm would pay.  It specified the routes through 
which user-firms could buy their coal.  And it banned all other transactions in coal.
26
 
  Subsidies.  Although the government did promise to compensate firms for the gap 
between the authorized price and production costs, it did not compensate.  Instead, it paid 
less and paid late.  Rather than compensate full losses it paid only part, and rather than 
pay promptly it delayed.  Given the hyper-inflation, that delay cut the actual scope of the 
compensation further still.  From April through July 5, 1947, mining firms claimed losses 
of 394 million yen.  Of this amount, the government eventually compensated 82.5 percent 
(325 million).  Of that 82.5 percent, it did not pay 69 percent (223 million yen) until late 
March 1948 (Hokkaido, 1958: 890).   
  In the interim the government loaned firms their expected compensation payment 
(fukkin yushi; Hokkaido, 1958: 862, 890 & tab. 340), but these loans would not have 
induced the firms to mine more.  The question is obviously over-determined.  Firms will 
not dig coal if production costs exceed the sales price, and they will not dig even if the 
buyer loans the sales price in advance.   
  Even if the sales price had been right, the firms would have used the loans to dig 
coal only if that earned them the highest returns.  Whether subsidized or no, loans are 
fungible.  If non-mining projects pay higher returns than mining, firms will shift the loans 
toward those other projects.  If the law requires that they apply the loans to the mines, 
they will shift their other funds out of mining and into those higher-paying projects.  If 
other firms have more promising projects in other industries, they will re-lend the funds 
to those other firms.  And if the law prohibits such re-lending, they will move the funds 
through trade credit.   
  The government promised the mining industry a variety of other subsidies as well.  
If the mine and the union promised to try to meet production goals it would deliver a 
bowl of barley-rice per worker per day.  It promised some clothing, cigarettes, sake, DDT, 
and soap (Asahi shimbun, Dec. 28, 1946).  Note that unless it effectively linked these 
supplies to output increases, however, it would not have changed the firms’ marginal cost 
of digging coal.  Absent changed marginal costs, the firms would not have dug. 
  
 (d)  Assessment.  Industry structure.  The JSP’s planners set themselves a 
Herculean task.  Through PPS they purported to control the distribution of (among other 
items) coal.  Yet as of 1948, 628 working mines produced the coal.  Of these mines, 489 
produced less than 50,000 tons a year.  Three mines produced more than 1 million tons, 
and another ten produced 500,000 to 1 million tons.  Together, though, these thirteen 
biggest mines produced barely 30 percent of the national total (Nihon sekitan, 1957: 10-
11). 
  But if the coal industry seems too dispersed for anyone to have controlled 
effectively, other industries under PPS were even more so.  Most extreme, rice was 
                     
26 Haitan kodan ho [Coal Distribution Public Corporation Act], Law No. 56 of Apr. 1947.  We detail the 
regulatory framework in Miwa & Ramseyer (2004b: 30-31). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 20 
produced by some 6 million.  It was consumed by tens of millions (Kase, 2002: 416-17).  
Nonetheless, the government tried to control this industry too. 
 
  Shortages.  In many sectors, PPS did not as much cause rationing as shortages.  
To buy PPS-controlled goods on the official market, a would-be buyer needed 
government coupons.  Through those coupons, he obtained the right to buy a specified 
amount at the specified price.  Yet if the coupon gave him the right to buy, it did not give 
him the ability to buy -- for it did not mean he could find anyone willing to sell.   
  In most industries, the government set the official price substantially below the 
market-clearing price.  By definition, of course, the market price is the price at which 
producers are willing to supply the amount consumers are willing to buy.  Set the official 
price below that market price, and shortages necessarily ensue.  At the official PPS price, 
in many sectors buyers simply could not locate many suppliers willing to sell.  
  As a result, the PPS coupon right was often an empty right.  Dower (1999: 99-
101) recounts the story of Judge Yoshitada Yamaguchi who died in October 1947 rather 
than buy food on the black market.  Unable to find enough to eat through legal channels, 
he simply starved.  Dower (id.) then castigates the "industrialists, politicians, and former 
military officers [who] made killings on the black market."  What he does not explain, of 
course, is that the only reason they had black markets on which to make their "killings" -- 
and the only reason Yamaguchi could find so little food legally -- lay in the stringent 
economic controls the JSP and ESS imposed.   
A single anecdote to be sure, the tale of Judge Yamaguchi captures a broader 
phenomenon under PPS and the JSP-ESS controls:  rampant shortages.  A firm that 
wanted steel, for instance, could expect a half-year delay.  During the fourth quarter of 
fiscal 1947 (Jan.-Mar. 1948), would-be buyers held unfilled orders for 308,000 tons.  Of 
those orders, suppliers were willing to supply only 120,000 tons (Shiba, 1948: 171).   
 
  Black market.  Rather than sell at official (low) prices legally, producers sold at 
market (high) prices illegally.  As inspectors fanned out across the country, they reported 
60,000 economic crimes a month (T. Cohen, 1987: 313).  For this massive policing effort, 
the Socialists counted on the U.S. military.  Reports Cohen (id.), "Eighth Army Military 
Government teams in the field were deployed all over the country to check the price of 
fresh fish."  The scope of the putative policing, of course, mostly just reflects the 
enormity of the problem.  Under the JSP-ESS controls, consumers and firms that needed 
controlled goods had little choice:  buy them illegally.  Buy them on the black market 
they did, and every time they did so they committed a crime. 
  In Table 2, we report the results of a 1948 inquiry into the channels by which 
large firms in several industries obtained their raw materials.
27  During 1947, cement 
producers bought 10-20 percent of their coal on the black market.  Paper pulp firms 
obtained 11 percent through the black market.  Bicycle makers bought 45 percent of their 
coke on the black market, and cotton weaving factories obtained half their coke there.   
  [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
  The controls caused a variety of peripheral crimes as well.  Coal buyers, for 
example, regularly encountered significant theft en route.  According to the government-
                     
27 The ESB commissioned the survey in early 1948 at 41 large factories. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 21 
controlled coal distribution firm, it usually found a 10 percent shortage on shipped orders.  
By its estimate, shippers routinely exaggerated the amount they sent by 5 percent (Shiba, 
1948: 154-55).  “Under SCAP,” wrote Fortune magazine in April 1949 (1949: 71), 
“Japanese morality has unquestionably changed for the worse, as the countless 
unnecessary controls have forced the Japanese ... into disregard of laws.  For without 
black-market transactions people go hungry and cold ....” 
 
  Production.  If the pretext behind PPS was to increase production, it was a goal 
the program did not meet.  Under PPS, firms produced only 73 percent of the pig iron 
planned in fiscal 1947.  They produced 86 percent of the steel planned, 72 percent of the 
ammonium sulfate, 92 percent of the soda ash, 67 percent of the cement, and 69 percent 
of the cotton thread (Tsusho, 1992: 85).   
  In Figure 2, we plot the official monthly target of 2.5 million metric tons of coal 
against the actual amounts produced.  Although PPS took effect in January 1947, firms 
mined slightly more than 2 million tons a month through most of the year.  Not until 
December did they finally break 2.5 million tons (Toyo, 1950b: 247-48).
28  Obviously, 
the fact that production fell below the nominal target is not decisive; the government 
might have set the target impossibly high.
29  The point instead is that production stayed 
flat during most of calendar 1947 -- the very period of PPS.  As Fortune put it (1949: 
208): 
The plain fact stands that the U.S., with everything in its favor, has had a clear 
field in which to operate, and on that field has spent more than $1 billion in 
fumbling attempts to revive the Japanese economy.  The result:  an economy 
without oil, chemicals, raw materials, shifts, without fresh capital, without 
incentives, harassed by bureaucrats who not only do not understand modern 
capitalism but are suspicious of it, rotting plants managed by men without 
executive experience, an economy half-dead, sucking in more and more American 
tax dollars to be wasted in unfocused experimentation. 
  [Include Figure 2 about here.] 
  Only after the government abandoned the JSP’s policies did production boom.  
After Katayama’s cabinet collapsed in February 1948, Ashida continued some but not all 
of Katayama's controls (the JSP remained in his coalition, but many of the strongest 
advocates of control left with Katayama).  Under the Ashida cabinet, production 
remained stuck at 2.5 to 2.9 million monthly tons (Toyo, 1950b: 247-48). 
  Urging the government to abandon these controls (Hokkaido, 1958: 788), in July 
Yoshida took his Liberal Party and bolted the coalition.  Once he had assembled a 
strongly non-interventionist cabinet in October, coal production proceeded apace.  He 
pulled the controls from the lowest grade coal in 1948, and the output immediately hit 3 
million tons.  In March 1949 it broke 3.5 million tons (Toyo, 1950b: 247-48).  By July of 
                     
28 Although production did continue to climb thereafter, the increases primarily reflected the increase in 
mining personnel.  In November, 1946 production per worker stood at a monthly 5.8 metric tons.  It remained below 
that range until October 1947, and even in December 1947 remained at 5.9 tons (Toyo keizai, 1950b: 251).   
29 That said, the 30 million metric ton target was set as a supremely important and eminently 
reachable goal.  Subsequent discussions of PPS have routinely taken it for granted that production did meet 
the targets set under PPS.  See generally Miwa & Ramseyer (2004b: 2, 9-10). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 22 
1950, Yoshida had dropped all controls over the coal industry, and production for the 
year hit 38 million tons.  By 1955 it soared to 42 million tons (Ando, 1979: 13).   
  If scholars miss the effect of a non-interventionist framework on post-war growth, 
perhaps they miss it because they take the stories of Japanese industrial policy at face 
value.  According to those tales, the Japanese economy grew during the 1950s-70s 
because the government intervened.  In fact, however, the stories are false.  As we show 
in detail elsewhere, the government never controlled Japanese economic growth (Miwa & 
Ramseyer, 2002b, 2003b, 2004a).  
 
E.  Did Dodge Stop Inflation?  Did He Wreck the Economy?
 1.    Inflation. -- Although historians routinely claim that Detroit banker Joseph 
Dodge (a) stopped inflation, but (b) stopped it by plunging Japan into a depression 
averted only by the Korean War, basic chronology suggests otherwise.  Consider the 
claim that he halted inflation.  On Figure 3, we plot monthly black-market price changes 
(in percent) from October 1946 to January 1951.  The message:  by July 1948, monthly 
inflation had dropped close to 0.  Although Dodge did not come until March 1949, 
inflation stopped almost immediately after Katayama's JSP-coalition cabinet collapsed in 
February 1948.
30   
[Insert Figure 3 about here.] 
The Japanese government stopped the inflation by lifting economic controls.   
After Katayama’s cabinet collapsed in February, Ashida assembled its replacement, and 
began de-control.  Yoshida replaced Ashida in October, accelerated the de-control, and 
swept the January 1949 elections (see Table 1). 
Yoshida won these votes on a platform to jettison the controls.  By winning the 
election overwhelmingly, he could claim a clear popular mandate.  With over half of the 
Diet seats, he had the legislative clout as well.  What he lacked until Dodge arrived in 
March was the power to stop the pressure for controls from ESS.   
Through Dodge, Yoshida obtained that power to stare down ESS.  Kiichi 
Miyazawa (eventually Prime Minister but a senior bureaucrat at the time) remembers 
Dodge lecturing Finance Minister (and also eventual Prime Minister) Ikeda on the need 
for austerity.  Preaching to Ikeda about austerity was preaching to the choir, but 
Miyazawa (1965) interpreted the lecture as aimed in part at the SCAP bureaucrats in the 
room.  “When Mr. Dodge came to Japan, I thought it was a great chance to get rid of the 
incompetents at ESS,” he (1955: 6) recalled.  “For whatever reason, I still clearly 
remember suggesting to Mr. Ikeda that we should throw in our lot with this Dodge.”   
With Dodge, Washington politicians finally moved to check the agency slack in 
Tokyo.  Until he arrived, mid-level bureaucrats in SCAP had systematically obstructed 
the efforts of men like Yoshida to place the economy on a stable platform.  In appointing 
Dodge, Washington finally acted.  Sensibly, Fortune (1949: 67) interpreted his 
appointment as “a kind of confession.”  In effect, reasoned the magazine, his appointment 
was “the nearest thing to an admission of failure that the taxpayer is likely to get.”  
 
 2.    The Korean War. -- If Dodge did not end the inflation, neither did the Korean 
War save the economy from disaster -- for by mid-1950 there was no disaster from which 
                     
30 A point rightly noted by Flath (2000: 84) and Nakamura (1986). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 23 
to save it.  Yoshida had dismantled the controls, and Dodge (by holding ESS at bay) had 
given him the latitude to do so.  Where Katayama’s Socialists and the bureaucrats at ESS 
and ESB had crippled the economy, Yoshida and Dodge had replaced their controls with 
straightforward, non-interventionist fiscal and economic policies.  Together, they placed 
the economy on the stable basis entrepreneurs needed to engineer a recovery.  Together, 
they began that recovery before the war even started. 
  Again, simple chronology tells the story.  On Figure 4, we plot monthly mining 
and manufacturing output from 1948 through 1951.  Dodge stayed in Japan from March 
(the first vertical line) to May of 1949, and for expositional simplicity we index April 
1949 production at 100.  Note that the Korean War began in June 1950 (the second 
vertical line).   
  [Insert Figure 4 about here.] 
  The Figure suggests two points relevant here.  First, although production 
stagnated for several months after Dodge left in May 1949, it did not decline.  Instead, it 
plateaued.  Second, by early 1950 production again began to grow.  By June 1950, it 
stood 20 percent above its level a year before.  Although the Korean War then conferred 
a munitions boom, the boom merely continued (at roughly the same pace) the growth that 
had already begun. 
 
III.  The “Reverse Course”
A.  Introduction: 
  Dower (2003c) speaks for many historians when he claims that “two years or so 
of genuine reformist idealism” characterized the early Occupation, and bemoans the 
“reverse course” that followed.  “U.S. policy became consumed by the Cold War,” he 
explains.  During the earlier years, SCAP had tried to “democratize” all aspects of 
Japanese society.  If only Cold-War zealots had not intervened, it might have succeeded. 
  “Idealism” is an odd way to characterize policies that would have slashed per 
capita incomes for years.  But absent intervention by zealots "consumed" by the Cold 
War, such is what the “idealists” would have done.  Dower’s idealists did not plan merely 
to dispossess the owners of the zaibatsu conglomerates.  They hoped to dissolve the 500 
largest firms, and to ship 500 factories abroad besides.   
  The term “idealist” misleads, of course, for it suggests the person held the best 
interests of Japanese people at heart.  Instead, in most histories of the period the term 
serves as code for those on the left.  In the mid-1940s, left-leaning Americans hated 
Japan at least as passionately as the rest of the country, and probably more.  The Japanese 
military had colonized China, allied itself with the Nazis, and repressed its own left-wing.  
To many observers on the left, it deserved whatever brutal measures they could offer it.  
Johns Hopkins lecturer and eventual MacCarthy target Owen Lattimore (1945: 189; more 
on him in Section III.C.2.(c), infra), for example, suggested that the U.S. intern the 
Emperor and "all males eligible for the throne ... in China ... under the supervision of a 
United Nations commission."  After all, he explained (1945: 49-50): 
The truth is that Japanese fascism is more deeply rooted than that of Germany.  
Nothing could be more quintessentially fascist than the Japanese phenomenon of 
a whole society of twentieth-century hands guided by medieval brains.  ...  The 
difference between the two countries can be summed up in one especially 
interesting contrast:  even stupid Nazis know that they have been taught, Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 24 
indoctrinated; but many intelligent Japanese do not know that their minds have 
been shaped long ago .... 
  In power in Tokyo, these U.S. “idealists” destroyed what they could.   
"Headquarters is full of 'reformers' ... work[ing] on a blueprint for a new Japanese 
economy," reported one journalist with glee (Sims, 2001: 241).  “There is wrecking 
aplenty [to be done, for] this is a feudal land, and no democracy can rise here until the old 
structure is demolished."  Dower (1986) makes much of the brutal racism he thinks 
animated the Pacific War.  As Lattimore's “especially interesting contrast” illustrates, 
however, racism was hardly a monopoly of the right.  And as the discussion of 
"deconcentration" and "reparations" below shows, the men who pushed hardest for a 
brutal Occupation were not the military men like MacArthur or the Cold-War zealots in 
Washington.  They were the "idealists" on the left like T.A. Bisson, Harry Dexter White, 
Edward Welsh, and Owen Lattimore. 
 
B.  Deconcentration: 
 1.    Zaibatsu dissolution. -- By “zaibatsu,” prewar Japanese journalists had referred 
to several large family-owned conglomerates.  Of these, the best known had been the 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi (owned by the Iwasaki family), Sumitomo, and Yasuda.  Firms in 
these conglomerates, the journalists had claimed, had excluded potential competitors and 
exploited consumers.   
  Among the most vocal U.S. critics of the zaibatsu had been T.A. Bisson.
31  “[A]t 
the center of each of the economic empires controlled by Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
and Yasuda,” wrote Bisson (1945: vii), “is a great bank with deposits running into 
billions of yen.  From these four banks, with their associated or subsidiary trust, 
insurance and holding companies, radiates the corporate network which owns the 
factories, the mines, the shipping firms, and the commercial enterprises of Japan.”   
Indeed, he (id.) continued, “[e]ight Zaibatsu concerns, together with the Emperor ... and 
some 3,500 big landlords, have held the country and its people as their economic fief.”  
Before the War, declared Bisson (1954: 3), “privileged groups had exercised despotic 
power in every phase of economic life.”  Together, they pushed the national economy to 
"the stage of a highly developed monopoly capitalism" (Bisson, 1935: 319). 
  In fact (as we explain elsewhere; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002a), zaibatsu firms had 
done nothing of the sort.  They simply had had the bad luck to thrive when muck-raking 
journalists in the early 1930s came looking for someone to blame for Japan’s corner of 
the international depression.  Among the many firms competing in the Japanese economy, 
these firms happened to be the most successful.  As such, populists christened them 
“zaibatsu.”  Although routinely translated “financial clique,” the term more idiomatically 
translates as “robber baron.” 
  Nonetheless, through the efforts of men like Bisson, SCAP quickly targeted the 
zaibatsu families, and by 1947 had dispossessed them.
32  It first required them to sell 
                     
31 Lattimore (1945: 186) made similar claims.  "The Zaibatsu, or giant combines controlled by a few 
families ... have had immense power over the state, and have supplied a great part of the motor energy driving the 
military mechanism."  He advocated nationalizing their assets. 
32 The report itself acknowledged that its recommendations were a foregone conclusion ([Edwards], 1946: 
iii):  the Edwards Mission's "assignment was to recommend ... standards, policies, and procedures for carrying out the 
basic objective of destroying the power of the great Japanese combines ...."  As Haley (2001: 30) put it, Edwards "and Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 25 
their interests in their firms to a “Holding Company Liquidation Commission.”  It then 
compensated them with modest amounts payable 10 years in the future.   
  In truth, SCAP had already bankrupted many of the zaibatsu firms anyway.  Like 
most companies that the military had forced to invest in the munitions industry, the 
zaibatsu firms held large claims against the government.  For many, only those accounts 
payable kept them afloat.   
  In November 1945, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to renege on the 91.8 
billion yen it owed these firms (Nihon keiei, 1985: 376).  Although the government 
initially resisted, under additional pressure from the British and Soviet representatives it 
eventually acquiesced.  When it did, most of the firms promptly became insolvent (e.g., 
Nihon keiei, 1985: 382).   
  By dissolving the relatively concentrated ownership of the zaibatsu firms, SCAP 
also slashed their productive efficiency.  Like most Japanese firms, the zaibatsu 
companies had bought, produced, and sold in competitive markets.  They had thrived 
only because they bought, produced, and sold more efficiently than their rivals.  As 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) showed, firms survive in such environments only if they 
maintain firm-specifically appropriate ownership patterns. 
 Through  the  zaibatsu dissolution program, SCAP destroyed that ownership 
equilibrium.  In related work, we explore the impact that the dissolution had on firm 
performance.  Significantly, we find that in 1952 ex-zaibatsu firms still under-performed 
their rivals.  Only as they reconfigured their ownership over the next several years did 
their performance converge to that of the economy as a whole (Miwa & Ramseyer, 
2003b). 
 
 2.    The deconcentration fiasco. -- (a) Introduction.  But SCAP bureaucrats wanted 
more.  They wanted far more than simply to dispossess a few zaibatsu families.  By 
liquidating virtually all large firms, they hoped fundamentally to “democratize” and 
“deconcentrate” the Japanese economy.  When news of their plan leaked to Washington, 
senior officials intervened before they could dissolve more than a few firms.  To most 
historians of the period, that intervention marks the onset of the “reverse course”:  by 
stopping the Occupation’s “deconcentration” plans, Washington signaled the triumph of 
Cold-War hysteria over the idealism of SCAP’s early years.
33
  Call it the “bomb the Fortune 500” plan.  SCAP "idealists" wanted nothing less 
than to liquidate the 500 biggest Japanese firms.  They did not care whether the firms had 
any ties to the zaibatsu families, whether they had profited from armaments, whether they 
paid their workers high wages or low, or even whether they were monopolists or 
competitive.  If the firms were big, they wanted them destroyed.   
 
 (b)  Edwards.  The “deconcentration” plan did trace its roots to the dissolution of 
the actual zaibatsu conglomerates themselves.  As U.S. leaders set out to liquidate the 
those conglomerates, they turned to Northwestern economist Corwin Edwards.  Together 
with seven others, in early 1946 he went to Japan. 
                                                             
the other members of the mission did not discover undue concentration in any industry, nor did they find any pattern of 
effective pricefixing or production controls."   
33 For an ingenuous summary of the debates, see Hadley (1970: chs. 6-9). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 26 
  Although Edwards would spend a few years at the University of Chicago, his was 
not what one would call “Chicago-school” economics.  Later, he would publish an essay 
called “Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power” (Edwards, 1955).  In it, he would 
claim (1955: 333-34): 
  An enterprise that is big in this sense obtains from its bigness a special 
kind of power, based upon the fact that it can spend money in large amounts.  If 
such a concern finds itself matching expenditures or losses, dollar for dollar, with 
a substantially smaller firm, the length of its purse assures it of victory.   
“Big is bad,” as nakedly as anyone ever claimed. 
  Edwards arrived with his team in January 1946, and issued his report in March 
([Edwards], 1946).  In it, he went far beyond urging SCAP to dissolve family empires 
like the Mitsui and Mitsubishi.  Instead, he asserted (Okura sho, 1982b: 339; ital. added): 
  [T]he term zaibatsu should be interpreted to include any private 
enterprise ... which, by reason of relative size in any line or the cumulative power 
of its position in many lines, restricts competition or impairs the opportunity of 
others to engage in business independently, in any important segment of 
business .... In applying this standard, it should be presumed ... that any private 
enterprise ... belongs to the zaibatsu if it is very large in total assets; if, though 
somewhat smaller in assets, it is engaged in business in various unrelated fields; if 
it controls substantial financial institutions as well as substantial industrial or 
commercial ones ....   
In short, Edwards urged SCAP to dissolve any firm successful enough to have grown to a 
publicly visible size. 
 
 (c)  FEC-230.  Once Edwards had filed his report, SCAP New Dealers skirted the 
upper echelons of Washington and Tokyo to transform it quickly into policy.  On the 
basis of his report, they drafted a “Statement of U.S. Policy with Respect to Excessive 
Concentration of Economic Power in Japan.”  In the acronymic world of the U.S. military, 
they named it SFE-182 and SWNCC 302/2.  By May 1947 they had re-christened it FEC-
230 and proposed it to the multinational supervisory Far Eastern Commission (FEC; 
reproduced in Hadley, 1970: App. IX). 
  In FEC-230, SCAP bureaucrats declared that “[t]he over-all objective of 
Occupation policy in dealing with excessive concentrations of economic power” was “to 
destroy such concentrations as may now exist” (Sec. 1.a.).  They paraphrased the 
paragraph above from Edwards (Sec. 2), and announced that “[a]bsolute size” was 
“grounds for defining a specified concentration as excessive.”  “Uncertainty as to 
whether any specified enterprise is covered,” they added, “should be resolved in favor of 
coverage since it is intended that ownership of the bulk of Japanese large-scale industry 
should be affected” (Sec. 2).  All covered firms, they then declared, would “immediately 
be dissolved” (Sec. 3).   
  The drafters of FEC-230 proposed to couple expropriation with a purge:  they 
would compensate dispossessed investors with nominal amounts payable ten years in the 
future and ban senior executives at the firms from the business world for a decade.  More 
specifically, they first announced that investors “who have exercised controlling power” 
over large firms would be “divested of all corporate security holdings.”  They further 
declared that senior executives at those firms would be “ejected from all positions of Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 27 
business or government responsibility.”  And they banned either group “from purchasing 
corporate security holdings or from acquiring positions of business ... responsibility” for 
ten years (Sec. 5).  If before the end of that decade either group seemed likely to make a 
“revival,” they suggested “added measures appropriate to the circumstances” (Sec. 6.d.).   
  As compensation, the drafters of FEC-230 planned to pay investors amounts that 
were small enough to “prohibit their buying back a place of power” (Sec. 6).  In 
disposing a firm of its assets, they would keep “sales to wealthy and economically 
powerful persons and corporations ... to a minimum,” and encourage sales to “agricultural 
or consumer cooperatives and trade unions” (Sec. 8.b.).  Whether these preferred buyers 
had the funds would not matter, because they would determine prices by “the purchaser’s 
ability to pay, rather than the real value of the holding” (Sec. 6.a.).  If a buyer did have 
the funds to pay market values, they intended to confiscate the bulk anyway:  any amount 
above “book value” (and most successful firms are worth far more than book value) 
would be subject to a tax of “not less than 90 %” (Sec. 6.b.).   
 
 (d)  Implementation.  To implement FEC-230, the New Dealers again skirted their 
nominal supervisors.  They marked the document confidential.  They never formally 
obtained its authorization as a military decree.  And they never obtained the approval of 
the FEC (T. Cohen, 1987: 359, 364).   
The man who would enforce FEC-230 was one Edward Welsh (he apparently had 
Bisson's support as well; Haley, 2001: 40).  Welsh held an Ohio State Ph.D. and had 
worked at the Office of Price Administration at the New Deal.  He now headed the 
Antitrust & Cartel Division of ESS.  As one participant in the Occupation remembered it, 
he made “deconcentration” a personal crusade (T. Cohen, 1987: ch. 19).   
Toward that end, on July 3, 1947, Welsh ordered the two largest trading 
companies, Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji, dissolved immediately -- as in, that very 
day.  Bussan’s 7,000 employees scattered to 170 firms, and Shoji’s 4,000 employees to 
120.  He did not dissolve them because they were zaibatsu firms, he explained.  He 
dissolved them to deconcentrate the economy (Okura sho, 1982a: 279-94).  "[B]ig and 
dominant corporations are undemocratic of themselves."
34
By destroying the two firms, Welsh substantially handicapped Japanese trade.   
More than any other institution, the firms had played a crucial part in connecting 
Japanese and overseas markets.  Notwithstanding the absence of any substantial barriers 
to rivals, during 1937-43 Bussan had handled 18.3 percent of all Japanese exports, and 
Shoji 10.3 percent (Mochikabu, 1951: 538-41).  Whether for Japanese firms cultivating 
markets abroad or for foreign firms identifying Japanese buyers, the two firms had played 
crucial intermediary roles, amassed enormous know-how, and cultivated wide-ranging 
personal ties. 
  To implement the (still unapproved) FEC-230, SCAP bureaucrats ordered the 
Japanese government to draft a statute.  The Cabinet duly produced a draft in September 
1947.  When Japanese legislators tried to discuss it, SCAP twice intervened to stop 
debate.  Having no real choice, they passed the statute in December.
35    
                     
34 Okura sho (1982a: 279-94).  The quotation comes from 1974, and is reported in Haley (2001: 33). 
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  Welsh moved quickly to implement the new law.  He planned to liquidate about 
500 firms, he initially explained.  As a start, he designated 325.  Together, the firms 
accounted for about two-thirds of all paid-in capital (Okura sho, 1982a: 517-19).   
 
 (e)  Abandonment.  An American plan to bomb the Fortune 500 (not munitions 
firms, not exploitative firms, not monopolist firms -- just whatever 500 firms happen to 
be biggest) sells magazines, and it sold Newsweek.  In late 1947, the magazine obtained a 
copy of the plan from New York lawyer James Lee Kauffman.  Before the War, 
Kauffman had practiced law in Tokyo and taught at the University of Tokyo Law Faculty.  
Eventually (and presumably for his role in scuttling FEC-230), he would earn an imperial 
citation (the Japanese equivalent of knighthood).  In mid-1947, he went to Japan.  Upon 
returning, he circulated a memorandum about FEC-230, and Newsweek scooped the 
story (Newsweek, 1947; T. Cohen, 1987: 366-67; Haley, 2001: 40-41).   
  As Kauffman saw it, SCAP intended FEC-230 as a way by which “the existing 
economy is to be destroyed and one radically different from ours is to be substituted” 
(Newsweek, 1947: 36).  Because of schemes like FEC-230, he warned “[s]ome Japanese 
have already lost their enthusiasm for the Occupation.”  The “number is being constantly 
increased,” he added (id., at 37) “by those who are beginning to doubt our good will and 
sincerity because of our economic policy. ...  As the existing chaos and confusion 
continue and the Japanese people enter another hard winter with practically no heat, few 
warm clothes, and little food, the number of doubters will grow.”    
  Even Under-Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., did not learn of FEC-
230 until he visited Japan in September 1947.  Upon returning to the U.S., he 
immediately warned the State Department that the plan “would make Japan a permanent 
ward of the United States.”  Facing growing opposition, the Truman administration 
withdrew the plan from the FEC.  By March 1948 it had abandoned the plan entirely.
36  
  As welcome as the retraction was for all but the hardest left-leaning Japanese, the 
chaos continued.  Welsh continued to designate firms, and by early 1948 had named 
several hundred more (T. Cohen, 1987: 370).  Once designated, the firms found 
themselves legally barred from a wide variety of transactions (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2004b: 
89-91).  For many, the designations did not disappear until July 1951.
37   
 
C.  Reparations: 
 1.    Morgenthau-White. -- SCAP “idealists” worked to destroy Japan’s industrial 
capacity not just through “deconcentration,” but through reparations as well.  That 
reparations-based strategy began with a plan by Treasury Secretary Hans Morgenthau 
and Assistant Secretary Harry Dexter White.  Although discussions of the plan usually 
involve Germany, its drafters also intended it for Japan.  Through reparations, argued 
Morgenthau and White, the U.S. should decimate what remained of German (and 
presumably Japanese) industrial capacity and return the country to agriculture.  If 
                     
36 Okura sho (1982a: 491, 511-17).  The day after the deconcentration bill took effect in Japan, 
California Senator William Knowland criticized it in a speach in the Senate, and used it to discredit 
MacArthur's Presidential candidacy.  See Flath (2000: 76-77).   
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preventing it from waging war made it "necessary to reduce Germany to the status of a 
fifth-rate power,” declared White, so be it:  “that should be done."
38   
  How much White drafted the plan to implement Morgenthau’s preferences 
remains unclear.  Morgenthau trusted White closely, and if White took a vengeful line 
toward Germany and Japan, so did Morgenthau.
39  In the last months of the War, so did 
many ordinary Americans.  As noted earlier (Section II.C.2.), Washington’s original 
instructions to MacArthur were as vengeful as they come. 
  Yet Morgenthau trusted the wrong man.  Stalin also wanted his neighbors on his 
eastern and western flanks decimated, and White was a Soviet agent.  Along with Alger 
Hiss (Assistant to the Secretary of State) and Lauchlin Currie (Administrative Assistant 
to the President), White was among the most eminent Americans in the Soviet spy 
network.  All three men appear prominently as Soviet spies in the recently released 
Venona trove of decoded Soviet cables.
40  
Whether White pushed the plan on his own initiative also remains unclear.   
Defector Elizabeth Bentley claimed not.  Instead, asserted she, White promoted it under 
orders from Moscow.
41  Although reviled for many years, Bentley now appears to have 
been right.  Where the Venona cables overlap with issues she discussed, they largely 
confirm her claims.  Conclude Cold-War historians Haynes & Klehr (1999: 163):  "The 
deciphered Venona cables show that Elizabeth Bentley had told the truth."
42  For our 
purposes, however, the dispute is largely beside the point.  What matters is that a Soviet 
agent designed and promoted a reparations plan for Germany and Japan that broadly 
promoted Soviet interests. 
 
 2.    Pauley. -- (a) The report.  Although Roosevelt discarded the Morgenthau-
White plan as too draconian, the early Occupation adopted a reparations plan for Japan 
almost as brutal anyway.  Behind this new plan too lay Soviet interests.  To design it, 
Truman appointed former-Democratic-Party treasurer Edwin Pauley.  Pauley named ten 
others to accompany him, went to Tokyo in November 1945, and submitted their report 
the following April (Pauley, 1946).  Crucially, as one of the ten he picked Owen 
Lattimore. 
  The Pauley Mission members began their report by reassuring the reader that 
American bombers had hit little more than Japan's "direct war industry" and plants that 
had supported the "war economy" (Pauley, 1946: 3).  Given that the carpet-bombing had 
incinerated half the homes in 66 cities (J. Cohen, 1949: 406), it is hard to imagine whom 
they thought they could fool.  Nonetheless, they asserted that "the industrial plant and 
equipment still standing have a production potential far greater than anything which the 
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rulers of Japan, throughout Japanese history, ever allowed the people of Japan to enjoy 
for their own peaceful use" (Pauley, 1946: 3).  Lest they leave any reader in doubt about 
their willingness to dissemble, they added that the "removal of surplus Japanese industrial 
potential will also be a direct benefit to the Japanese people themselves" (id.: 4). 
  That the mission members cared more about decimating the tattered remains of 
Japanese industry than about compensating victims (even less about the good of “the 
Japanese people themselves”) appears in their proposal to scrap factories not wanted 
abroad.  Suppose, for example, that no recipient country claimed a designated plant.   
According to the mission, SCAP should not let Japanese firms keep it.  Instead, SCAP 
should destroy it (e.g., Pauley, 1946: 14-15). 
  If the Morgenthau-White Plan would have left Germany "pastoral," the Pauley 
Mission would have created an equally pre-industrial Japan.  SCAP should urge Japanese 
to produce foodstuffs, the Mission urged.  It should facilitate the growth of the "silk, tea, 
and lumber" industries.  And for exports, it should encourage Japan to make "cement, 
handicrafts, porcelain, and toys" (Pauley, 1946: 7).   
  To force Japan back to the pre-industrial stage, the Pauley Mission urged 
draconian steps.  Inter alia, it recommended that SCAP:  (a) in steel -- eliminate 5 million 
metric tons of blast-furnace capacity but keep 500,000 m.t.; eliminate 6 million m.t. of 
rolling-mill capacity but keep 1.5 million m.t.; and eliminate 3 million m.t. of electric 
furnace capacity and 6 million m.t. of open-hearth capacity (Pauley, 1946: 13-15); (b) in 
chemicals -- eliminate 240,000 m.t. capacity in nitric acid but keep 12,500 m.t.; eliminate 
450,000-500,000 m.t. capacity in soda ash but keep 300,000 m.t.; eliminate 195,000 m.t. 
capacity in caustic soda but keep 44,000 m.t.; eliminate 175,000 m.t. capacity in chlorine 
but keep 40,000 m.t.; eliminate all capacity in tar distillates; eliminate all capacity in 
alcohol production for explosives or motor fuel; and eliminate all capacity in celluloid 
production (id.:  15-17); (c) in machine tools:  eliminate 600,000 machine tools, but keep 
175,000; and eliminate all ball-, roller-, and similar bearing production equipment (id.: 
17-19); (d) in shipbuilding:  eliminate 42 shipyards and keep 22 (id.: 24-25); (e) in 
aluminum and magnesium:  destroy both industries entirely (id.: 29-31; and (f) in gold:  
"the bulk of gold and other precious metals now amassed in Japan should be shipped to 
the United States Mint in San Francisco" (id.:  43).  
 
 (b)  The effect.  Although SCAP did tag several hundred plants to ship abroad, it 
never sent them.  MacArthur rightly worried that the Plan would delay recovery, and 
stalled.  Under pressure from Pauley and others, he eventually did agree to a set of 
“advance interim removals.”  By this compromise, in early 1948 he shipped 19,000 
machine tools to China, the Philippines, the Netherlands, and the U.K. (T. Cohen, 1987: 
148-52).   
  MacArthur never shipped or destroyed much else.  Instead, to undo the Pauley 
Report, he and the War Department organized a second mission.  For it, they hired 
consulting engineer Clifford Strike.  Strike came, and with his team recommended in 
early 1948 that the U.S. abandon the bulk of the reparations program.  A few months later, 
yet a third mission (the Draper-Johnston Mission) arrived, and recommended still lower 
reparations (J. Cohen, 1949: 419-27).   
  Although the U.S. did eventually abandon the Pauley Plan, many firms remained 
unsure of their status for another three years.  After all, the Occupation was nominally a Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 31 
joint Allied enterprise, and the U.S. could not set formal policy on its own.  Several other 
countries insisted on reparations through the end.  As a result, until the Occupation closed 
in 1952, 850 plants remained officially “designated” for removal under the reparations 
program.  As such, their owners could neither remove equipment nor make major 
changes.  Facing a non-trivial risk that SCAP might yet ship their plant overseas, 
moreover, they had little incentive to upgrade it.  Observed Fortune magazine, “the 
possibility of reparations removals still haunts every factory bigger than a laundry.  Why 
should a Japanese work like a beaver if his plant is to be dismantled and shipped abroad 
at some future date?”
43
  When SCAP finally released the designated plants in 1952, many owners 
retrieved an unimproved and often long-mothballed 1945-vintage (if not earlier) factory.  
Given the pace of technological change, many of these factories would have become 
long-since obsolete.  Some would have suffered from the mothballing itself.  One of the 
men Washington sent to Japan was chemical-industry executive Frederick Pope.  Eyeing 
several factories that a SCAP bureaucrat had shuttered, Pope remarked (Newsweek, 
1949: 45):   
[T]he decision of this man to close them down for one year, to put them in storage, 
as it were, was the most ridiculous idea that has been presented in the chemical 
industry.  Anyone who knows anything at all about chemical plants knows that 
leaving a chemical plant stand idle for any length of time is completely 
impractical.  Employes (sic), usually trained over a lifetime, scatter.  The 
management scatters.  Since chemicals are corrosives the plant goes to pieces.   
 
 (c)  The politics.  Perhaps all this misses the point, however, for (as suggested 
earlier) reparations were never about compensation.  SCAP official Theodore Cohen 
(1987: 147) recalled: 
[I]t made no sense at all.  Japanese industrial plants, individually designed to 
begin with, depended on supplementary fixed facilities:  docks, rail spurs, a 
suitable power supply, and so forth. ...  Often they were integrated with nearby 
factories that provided them with semiprocessed products to finish or vice versa. 
Instead, as Pope (Newsweek, 1949: 45) put it: 
[T]he only excuse for reparations is revenge.  As far as chemical plants are 
concerned, reparations are an impossibility ....  You can’t move a chemical plant, 
tear it down, and rebuild it as cheaply as you can build a new one.  If you do 
move one, you start with a secondhand plant -- there’s nothing worse than a 
secondhand chemical plant.  
  Yet if reparations made no sense as compensation, they made perfect sense to 
Stalin.  For all the reasons Cohen and Pope noted, the Pauley Plan would not have much 
helped the recipients.  Because moving the plants would have wrecked havoc with 
Japanese production, however, it did threaten Japanese welfare.  Because the U.S. 
subsidized the Japanese economy, it threatened U.S. welfare as well.  And the fact that it 
would have crippled Japan was precisely the point.  Stalin wanted weak neighbors.  The 
Morgenthau-White Plan would have given him weak states on both his western and 
eastern flanks.  The Pauley Plan at least would have given him a weak Japan on the east. 
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  Among the Pauley eleven, Owen Lattimore figured prominently:  of the group, 
only two handled multiple industries, and one who did was Lattimore (Newman, 1992: 
145, 149).  Lattimore mercilessly parroted the party line.  Most famously, when asked 
about Stalin’s show trials and purges he once replied:  "That sounds to me like 
democracy" (id.: 40; he was not joking).  Ruminating about agricultural production in 
China, he assured his readers (Lattimore, 1949: 129) that “wherever the Communists 
have taken over they have increased food production, controlled distribution, and 
stabilized prices, successfully breaking the old cycle of recurring shortages and famines."  
And the counter-revolutionaries that the Chinese Communists massacred?   
For every landlord or "bourgeois" killed, scores of peasants were slaughtered, 
tortured, or burned in their villages; untold numbers of peasant girls were sold 
into brothels and boys into bondage.  In China, as in Pilsudski's Poland, in the 
Baltic States, and in Mannerheim's Finland, the White Terror was worse than the 
Red because in a peasant country revolution attempts to break the grip of a 
minority, while counterrevolution attempts to break the will of the majority. 
(Lattimore, 1945: 93-94).  Time and again, Lattimore swayed with the winds from 
Moscow.
44
  Lattimore also counted several Soviet spies among his closest friends and 
associates.  At the Institute of Pacific Relations, he edited the official journal.  At the 
Amerasia magazine, he served on the editorial board.  As the Venona cables and FBI 
wiretap transcripts show, both institutions served as fronts for Soviet and Communist 
Chinese agents.
45   
More troubling still, Lattimore was one of Lauchlin Currie's "good friends" 
(Sandilands, 1990: 129; Currie's biographer's words).  As administrative assistant to 
Roosevelt, Currie arranged for Lattimore to serve as political advisor to Chang Kai-shek 
in 1941.  He arranged for Lattimore to accompany Henry Wallace (then vice president) to 
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China in 1944.  And he even tried (unsuccessfully) to convince Roosevelt to appoint 
Lattimore ambassador to China (Sandilands, 1990: 112, 124, 128-29).   
  As noted earlier, according to the Venona Soviet cables Currie was also a Soviet 
spy.  The Lattimore who relentlessly followed the Soviet party line, who worked at a 
Soviet espionage front, and who routinely received prominent nominations from a Soviet 
spy in the White House -- this Lattimore helped draft a reparations policy that tracked an 
earlier plan co-designed by another Soviet spy, possibly on orders from Moscow.   
  More directly, this Lattimore handled light metals and machine tools -- and light 
metals were a sector the Pauley Mission urged SCAP to destroy entirely, while machine 
tools were the only sector from which SCAP actually shipped anything abroad.  In the 
end, SCAP did reject the Pauley Plan.  But just by stalling investments and idling plants it 
had already cut Japanese welfare.  Had it actually implemented the Plan, it would have 
slashed it further still.   
  As the Japanese economy began to boom, machine tools mattered greatly.  In 
sectors like the automobile and automobile parts industry, they proved crucial.  Yet 
during the 1950s, firms in these sectors made do with what they had, and what they had 
was very old.  Even as late as 1958, over half the machine tools in the automobile and 
automobile parts industries were 10-20 years old (Miwa, 2004: 219 tab. 2.4).  In the 
metalworking machinery industry, they were older still (id.: 207 tab. 2.1).  When the 
Japanese economy began to grow, in short, it grew by exploiting the very machines that 
Lattimore had tried to eliminate. 
  Lattimore knew machine tools would matter.  Indeed, he explicitly described 
them as "one of the key factors in all modern industry" (1949: 119).  As the Pauley 
Report (1946: 17; in a section presumably drafted by Lattimore) put it, "machine tools are 
the heart of modern industry."  Precisely because they were at its heart, Lattimore wanted 
them gone.  Japan "remained industrially the most powerful national in Asia," he 
explained (1949: 118).  The way “to insure against a too rapid revival of Japanese power" 
was to destroy its machine tool capacity. 
Whether Lattimore consciously worked for Soviet intelligence is not the issue.  
Hardly the “top Russian spy” Joseph McCarthy claimed (Newman, 1992: 215), he may 
not have been a spy at all.  His apparent ties to Soviet intelligence, after all, are entirely 
circumstantial.  Instead, Lattimore would have pushed Soviet interests on his own.  In 
1946, Khrushchev had not yet disclosed the scope of Stalinist terror and Mao's worst 
atrocities still lay ahead.  In this environment, men like Lattimore did not need 
instructions from Moscow to place the interests of a collectivist ally like the U.S.S.R. 
over those of a Nazi-aligned enemy like Japan.   
 
IV.  Other Programs
  SCAP imposed two other principal programs, but in this study we address them 
only peripherally:  land “reform,” and the purges.  First, in 1945-47 SCAP and the 
Japanese government took farm land from 3.7 million Japanese (a number that reached 
far into the middle class) and distributed it to those who had cultivated it (Flath, 2000: 
75).  Because the government promised far less than market value, paid the promised 
amounts in 30-year bonds, and radically deflated the currency, it effectively confiscated 
the land.  In some cases, it took a 1/10th of a hectare of good paddy land for little more 
than 13 packs of cigarettes (Kawagoe, 1993: 195).   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 34 
  In substance, the Japanese government (a) levied a confiscatory asset tax on those 
who happened to have invested in agricultural real estate, and (b) conferred a 
corresponding windfall on those who happened to have worked in agriculture on rented 
land.  Given that pre-War landowners had every incentive to adopt all cost-effective ways 
to exploit their real estate, one would not expect this pair of transactions to increase 
production.  According to the research to date, it did not (Kawagoe, 1993: 199-200; Flath, 
2000: 74). 
  Second, upon taking power SCAP set out to purge the government and business 
community of suspected militarists (Baerwald, 1959).  In fact, most business leaders had 
realized that war with the U.S. would be bad for business, and opposed military 
expansion.  No matter.  Men like Bisson (1945) insisted that they had masterminded the 
expansion, and SCAP accepted their claims.  Initially, it planned to purge 200,000 
executives.  In the end, it purged 453 executives, and about the same number resigned in 
advance (T. Cohen, 1987: 155, 169).   
  According to most historians, after the "reverse course" SCAP purged 
Communists instead.  The claim misleads, for most of the Communists were purged not 
by SCAP but by Japanese firms and the Japanese government.  From July to December 
1950, Japanese firms fired about 11,000 employees.  Many of these 11,000 were not 
simply Communists; they were also among the most militant union organizers.  We doubt 
the firms much cared how their assembly-line workers voted.  We do think they might 
have wanted to couch their union-busting tactics in terms the Occupation would find 
palatable. 
  For by the fall of 1950, the Occupation did indeed find the discharge of JCP-
affiliated union leaders palatable.  As noted earlier (Section II.B.5.), in January 1950 
Stalin had castigated the JCP for cooperating with the Occupation, and ordered it to adopt 
more violent tactics.  After some internal dissent, the Party had agreed to comply.  Its 
leaders went underground, and began the terrorist sabotage that would characterize the 
Party for the next several years.  Five months later, the North Korean army invaded the 
south, and American forces began ordering massive amounts of military equipment from 
Japanese firms.  Yet firms like Nissan had Communist-controlled unions.  Given the 
terrorist strategy the JCP had explicitly adopted, SCAP feared -- plausibly -- that JCP 
unionists would sabotage their purchases (T. Cohen, 1987: 451-52). 
  During roughly the same period, the Japanese government also fired about 11,000 
Communist employees.  Recall, however, that in February 1949 Yoshida’s Liberal Party 
had swept the polls.  To such a center-right party, Communists were obviously the 
government employees at the farthest ideological distance.  Effectively, by firing them 
Yoshida fired the employees who most adamantly opposed the policies voters had elected 
him to enforce. 
  Given these dynamics, characterizing the “Red Purge” as a product of a Cold-War 
hysteria misses much of the story.  At root, the purge had two fundamentally distinct 
components, and both were indigenously Japanese.  At the private firms, managers fired 
their most militant union organizers.  At the government, the incumbent party fired those 
employees most likely to disrupt the policies voters had elected it to implement.  One can 
debate the propriety of managers skirting labor laws to fire union organizers, just as one 
can contest the propriety of politicians skirting civil-service rules to fire their political Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 35 
opponents.  Ultimately, however, those dynamics -- rather than any Cold-War-induced 
paranoia -- drove the “Red Purge”. 
 
V.  Conclusions
  In the chaos of the early post-War months, Marxist academics and command-and-
control bureaucrats took control of the Japanese government.  To enable them to 
implement their preferred policies, New Deal bureaucrats in the Occupation manipulated 
their own organization as necessary.  And in 1947, Socialist politicians with a quarter of 
the vote cobbled together a coalition government.  Together, the four groups imposed and 
enforced a series of wide-ranging and stringent controls over prices, wages, and 
distribution.   
  Disaster ensued.  The controls stymied production, created rampant shortages, and 
generated thriving black markets.  With the controls wrecking havoc, Japanese voters 
threw out the Socialists.  In their stead, they elected center-right politicians who promised 
a competitive, free-market economy.  Upon taking control, these politicians then 
promptly shut down the controls.  Belatedly realizing what their officers in Tokyo had 
been doing, Washington intervened to let Japanese voters create the capitalist framework 
they wanted.  The economy rebounded, and the recovery followed.   
  Western historians routinely miss this mundane account of Japanese politics.  Ian 
Buruma (1994: 296), for example, claims (with no evidence) that the elections had been 
“rigged” to let the conservatives win, and bizarrely opines that this "stopped the Japanese 
from growing up politically."  Gordon (2003: 238) finds the conservative victory "rooted 
in fear of the unknown and a deep desire for the return of some sort of familiar 
'normalcy.'"   
  And historians show a parallel blindness toward policy in Washington.  Rather 
than explain the “reverse course” as a straightforward attempt to curb agency slack in 
Tokyo, they cite mass paranoia.  Rather than note that by 1946 American voters too had 
rejected New Deal economic controls, they attribute the policy shift to the Cold War.  
  Yet when in 1947 Washington shifted the Occupation into its “reverse course,” 
most of the defining moments of the Cold War lay still in the future.  The Soviets did not 
blockade Berlin until 1948, Mao would not take China until 1949, North Korea would not 
invade the south until 1950, and the Soviets would not test the A-Bomb until 1950 either.  
By the time the Cold War finally took hold, the Occupation had been in “reverse” for 
years. 
  
  The U.S. Occupation of Japan is not a tale of success through careful preparation.  
Indeed, it is not a tale about preparation at all.  Neither is it a tale of social peace insured 
through scrupulous administration.  It is not a tale of idealistic enthusiasm cut short by 
anti-Communist hysteria.  It is not a tale of innovative populism undercut by old-school 
politicians.  It is not a tale of government planning sabotaged by hegemonic industrialists, 
and it is not a tale of economic competition undone by scheming monopolists.   
  Instead, the story of the Occupation is firstly a tale of barely planned and badly 
executed American oversight hijacked by men (both Japanese and American) determined 
to impose on the country their private vision of the public good.  It was a vision of 
government directives supplanting economic markets.  It was a vision voters did not 
share.  And it was a vision that failed. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 36 
  The story is secondly a tale of democracy working as it should.  By 1947 Japanese 
citizens realized that this command-and-control approach did not work.  They used their 
vote to retake the government.  And they shut down the control apparatus.   
  And the story is thirdly a tale of Washington leaders belatedly constraining the 
agency slack within their own Occupation.  By reining in their New Deal bureaucrats in 
SCAP, the U.S. government gave Japanese voters the chance to implement the policies 
they wanted.  They wanted a capitalist framework, and that framework became the 
foundation for the growth that followed.   
 Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 37 
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Table 1:  Selected Electoral Results: 
 
 
      Progres- 
Election  sive*  Liberal  JSP  JCP   Cooperative  Other 
4/10/46  
  Seats  94 140  92 5  14 119 
  Vote  %  18.7 24.4 17.8 3.8  3.2  32.1 
 
4/25/47 
  Seats  121 131 143 4  29  38 
  Vote  %  25.0 26.9 26.2 3.7  7.0  11.2 
 
1/23/49 
  Seats  69 264  48 35 14 36 
  Vote  %  15.7 43.9 13.5 9.7  3.4  13.8 
 
10/1/52 
 Seats  85  240  111**  0    30 




  * Known initially as the Democratic Party. 
 
  ** In the 1952 election, the JSP was split into left- 
and right-wing factions; the figure given is the total. 
 
  Source:  Kiyoaki Tsuji, ed., Shiryo:  Sengo 20 nen 
shi:  1 Seiji [Materials:  The 20 Years of Post-War 
History:  1 Politics] (Tokyo:  Nippon hyoron sha, 1966), pp. 
448, 450. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 45 
 
Table 2:  Source of Materials Used,  
by Industry in 1948 
 
 
Industry Raw  Mat  Own Legal  Other   
 Materials  Stocks  Channels  Channels 
Cotton  Pig iron  50   5  45 
weaving  Steel  70   5  25     . 
Multi- Silicon  board  20  60 20 
purpose  Pig iron   5  25  70 
generator Electrical  wire  35  40  25 
  Cotton tape  35  50  15     . 
Light bulb  Tungston  92     8 
  Soda ash  30  70         . 
Bicycle Steel  28 37  35 
 paint  43  23  34 
  coke    55  45     . 
Paper Wood  16  84 
pulp Chemicals    5  68  27 
  Coal   6  83  11     . 
Automobile  Steel  25  50  25     . 
 
     Source:  Kokumin keizai kenkyu kyokai, Dai 2 kai shuyo 
kigyo seisan jittai chosa hokoku sho [Second Report of the 
Investigation into the Production of Major Firms] (Tokyo:  
Kokumin keizai kenkyu kyokai, 1948). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 46 
Figure 1: Production Costs and Official 
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  Source:  Hokkaido tanko kisen, K.K., ed., Sekitan 
kokka tosei shi [A History of the National Controls over 
Coal] (xxx:  Nihon keizai kenkyu sho, 1958), p. 878 tab. 
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  Source:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, Showa sangyo shi, Dai 
3 kan [Showa Industrial History, Vol. 3] (Tokyo:  Toyo 
keizai shimpo sha, 1950), pp. 247-48. 
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Figure 3: Black-Market Price Index: 
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  Note:  Prices are for Tokyo. 
 
  Source:   Okura sho zaisei shi shitsu, ed., Showa 
zaisei shi -- shusen kara kowa made, dai 19 kan [Japanese 
Finance History:  From the End of the War to the Peace 
Treaty, v. 19] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1978), pp. 
60-61, 64-65.   
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Figure 4:  Indexed Production: 






















  Source:   Okura sho zaisei shi shitsu, ed., Showa 
zaisei shi -- shusen kara kowa made, dai 19 kan [Japanese 
Finance History:  From the End of the War to the Peace 
Treaty, v. 19] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1978), pp. 
87-88.   
 